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INTRODUCTION 
I T is a bedrock principle of American law that reprehensible conduct should be punished and that the punishment should be 
proportionate to the crime.1 This, however, does not always come 
to pass. On occasion, both our civil and criminal justice systems 
mete out disproportionately severe punishments.2 
In the civil justice system, disproportionate punishments can 
take the form of excessive punitive damages. Punitive damages are 
awarded not to compensate the plaintiff, but to punish the defen-
dant for wrongful conduct and to deter the defendant and others 
from perpetrating such conduct again.3 In recent years, punitive 
1 See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983) ("The principle that a punishment 
should be proportionate to the crime is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in 
common-law jurisprudence [as far back as the Magna Carta in 1215]."). Notable dis-
cussions of the idea that punishment should be proportionate to the crime can be 
found in Cesare Beccaria, Of Crimes and Punishments 73-76 (Jane Grigson trans., 
Marsilio Publishers 1964) (1764); Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles 
of Morals and Legislation in A Bentham Reader 121-33 (Mary Peter Mack ed., 1969) 
(1789); H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility 25 (1968); Andrew Von Hirsch, 
Doing Justice: The Choice of Punishments 66-76 (1976). 
2 See BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (finding a $2 million punitive 
damages verdict for selling a repainted car as new to be disproportionate); Helm, 463 
U.S. at 303 (finding a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole 
for the commission of a seventh nonviolent property felony to be disproportionate). 
3 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,350 (1974) ("[Punitive damages] are 
not compensation for injury .... [T]hey are private fines levied by civil juries to pun-
ish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence."). For an economic 
perspective on deterrence and punishment in the context of punitive damages, see A. 
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shaven, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 
Harv. L. Rev. 869 (1998). For a broader overview of the numerous legal questions 
that punitive damages raise, see Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 3.11 (2d ed. 1993). 
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damages verdicts have skyrocketed in both frequency and amount.4 
As a result, courts increasingly have been inundated with appeals 
that punitive damages verdicts are disproportionate and hence 
should be struck down.5 Perhaps more obviously, criminal defen-
dants also claim that they have been punished disproportionately. 
Putting aside the distinct (and perhaps more contentious) issue of 
proportionality in death-penalty cases,6 criminal proportionality 
4 See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989) (O'Connor, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Awards of punitive damages are skyrock-
eting. As recently as a decade ago, the largest award of punitive damages affirmed by an 
appellate court in a products liability case was $250,000 .... Since then, awards more 
than 30 times as high have been sustained on appeal." (citation omitted)); John Calvin 
Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 Va. L. Rev. 
139, 139 (1986) ("In my view, punitive damages are out of control. Certainly recent 
awards are unprecedented in both incidence and amount."). But see Theodore 
Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Punitive Awards After BMW, a New Capping System, 
and the Reported Opinion Bias, 1998 Wis. L. Rev. 387, 417 ("No credible evidence 
supports the claim that punitive damages are awarded frequently, that when they are 
awarded they are unrelated to compensatory damages, or that punitive damages are 
systematically awarded in inappropriate cases."). 
s There are two different kinds of appeals defendants can make to challenge exces-
sive punitive damages verdicts. First, defendants can request that the trial court order 
remittitur (that is, reduction) of the jury's verdict. The trial court has the power to 
conclude that the evidence does not support the size of the punitive damages verdict 
assessed by the jury or that the verdict is simply excessive. Having found the amount 
of damages to be too high, the trial court can reduce the damages to a permissible 
level. The plaintiff then has the option to accept the court's assessment of the dam-
ages or to have a new trial. In the federal system and in many states, if a trial court 
declines to grant remittitur the defendant can appeal the verdict to an appellate court, 
contending that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant remittitur. See 
Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415,436 (1996). See generally James C. 
Lopez, Comment, Appellate Control of Excessive Jury Verdicts Since Gasperini v. 
Center for Humanities: From Nisi Prius Courts to "Gasperini Hearings," 66 U. Cin. L. 
Rev. 1323 (1998). The second way in which a defendant can challenge a punitive 
damages verdict is to claim that the verdict is so grossly excessive that it violates the 
Constitution's guarantee of due process. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 562-63. It is this sec-
ond method that will be the focus of this Note. 
6 This Note deals only with the Supreme Court's proportionality review of excessive 
prison sentences and does not broach the even more complicated topic of proportion-
ality review in capital punishment cases. The Supreme Court has recognized that 
"death is ... different" and in doing so has required greater procedural safeguards in 
capital cases. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976). The Court has 
repeatedly affirmed that in capital cases the punishment must be proportionate to the 
crime. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982) (finding a death sentence for 
felony-murder to be disproportionate when the defendant neither killed, attempted to 
kill, nor intended' to kill); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (finding the 
death penalty to be a disproportionate punishment for the crime of rape of an adult 
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claims usually involve the question of whether a prison sentence is 
too long for a given crime. 7 
Although the Supreme Court has on occasion discussed the law 
of excessive criminal punishments when deciding punitive damages 
cases,8 the Court has nevertheless developed two distinct sets of ju-
risprudence.9 In the excessive criminal punishment area, after a 
long and tumultuous history,10 the Court has pronounced that suc-
cessful proportionality challenges to criminal punishments will be 
exceedingly rare.11 Moreover, the Court's current test to determine 
if a criminal punishment is excessive allows lower courts to dispose 
of such claims without conducting rigorous review.12 Conversely, 
the Court recently struck down a punitive damages award as exces-
sive13 and delineated a multi-factored test for lower courts to utilize 
in assessing the proportionality of other punitive damages ver-
dicts.14 This multi-factored proportionality test is vague and gives 
lower courts leeway to strike down punitive damages awards as 
they see fit.15 It thus appears that the Supreme Court has not only 
analyzed excessive criminal punishment claims separately from ex-
cessive punitive damages verdicts, but it has also promulgated 
different levels of proportionality review for the two areas. Strin-
woman); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (upholding the constitutionality 
of the death penalty but noting that the punishment must not be grossly out of pro-
portion to the crime). However, in light of recent decisions upholding the death 
penalty for felony-murder (Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987)), minors over the 
age of sixteen (Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)), and the mentally retarded 
(Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)), at least one scholar contends that the Su-
preme Court has neglected its duty to conduct rigorous proportionality review in 
capital cases. See Michael Mello, Executing Rapists: A Reluctant Essay on the Ethics 
of Legal Scholarship, 4 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 129, 154 (1997). 
7 For a discussion of other proportionality challenges to criminal and civil punish-
ments, such as objections to multiple punishments for the same offense, see Nancy J. 
King, Portioning Punishment: Constitutional Limits on Successive and Excessive Pen-
alties, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 101 (1995). 
8 See infra note 100 and accompanying text, discussing Justice O'Connor's use of a 
criminal proportionality test in the punitive damages context. 
9 See Part I, infra. 
10 See infra Part I.A, discussing the Court's key decisions in the area of excessive 
criminal punishments. 
11 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment). 
l 2 See infra notes 143-57 and accompanying text. 
13 SeeBMW ofN. Am. v. Gore,517U.S. 559,574-75 (1996). 
14 See id. at 574-85. 
15 See infra notes 174-201 and accompanying text. 
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gent proportionality review is afforded to punitive damages ver-
dicts while curt proportionality analysis is conducted for criminal 
punishment cases. 
Affording greater proportionality review to punitive damages 
verdicts than to criminal punishments ,initially appears to make 
sense: Criminal punishments are determined by legislatures and 
hence should be struck down reluctantly, while punitive damages 
verdicts are awarded by randomly selected juries and hence should 
be entitled to less deference. Two lines of thought, however, cast 
doubt on the validity of this conclusion. 
First, a simple hierarchical argument suggests that subjecting a 
defendant to mcarceration is more serious than forcing a defendant 
to pay punitive damages.16 In its death-penalty jurisprudence, the 
Supreme Court has recognized that deprivations of life are entitled 
to more protection than deprivations of liberty. If life is more im-
portant than liberty, it stands to reason that liberty in tum may be 
more important than property. Criminal sentences amount to dep-
rivations of liberty, while punitive damages awards are only 
deprivations of property. Given that incarceratmg a defendant is 
more serious than forcing him to pay punitive damages, more rig-
orous proportionality review should be afforded to excessive 
criminal sentences. 
Second, a more complicated (and more compelling) political 
process argument suggests that criminal punishments should be 
subject to more rigorous proportionality review.17 Political process 
theory posits that courts should abstam from meddling in legisla-
tive matters uuless there has been a failure in the political process.18 
In the case of excessive criminal punishments there often has been 
such a failure. Criminals are consistently the most reviled group in 
American politics, and legislators compete to be the toughest on 
crime.19 Given the "tough on crime" rhetoric pervading our dis-
16 See infra Part IV.B. 
17 See infra notes 240-68 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 228--39 and accompanying text, explaining political process theory. 
19 For a recent example, see James Dao, Schumer and D'Amato Try to Out-Tough 
Each Other on Crime, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1998, at Bl. At the same time that 
"tough on crime" rhetoric has led to stiffer penalties on the legislative front, it has 
also led to fewer commutations by executives. See Susan E. Martin, Commutation of 
Prison Sentences: Practice, Promise, and Limitation, 29 Crime & Delinq. 593, 609-10 
(1983) (concluding that where "tough on crime" rhetoric was prevalent, commuta-
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course and the fact that there is no powerful lobby fighting for rea-
sonable criminal sentences,20 the political process cannot be 
counted on to remedy disproportionate punishments.21 Conversely, 
the legislative process can and does successfully deal with the prob-
lem of excessive punitive damages awards. 22 Those who are likely 
to be the victims of punitive damages, such as large corporations, 
have the resources to lobby for limitations on punitive damages. 
This access to the political process is the reason why legislatures all 
across the couutry have considered and adopted a plethora of laws 
limiting punitive damages verdicts through caps, or even banning 
punitive damages altogether.23 Since the political process can effec-
tively deal with excessive punitive damages verdicts but not with 
disproportionate criminal punishments, it would make more sense 
tions decreased). One need look no further than the political brouhaha that erupted 
over President Clinton's decision to grant clemency to fourteen Puerto Rican nation-
alists (some would say terrorists) to understand the political pressure not to grant 
clemency. See Charles Babington, Puerto Rican Nationalists Freed From Prison, 
Wash. Post, Sept 11, 1999, at A2. Additionally, "tough on crime" rhetoric has infected 
the federal judicial confirmation process. Recently, the full Senate rejected a federal 
judicial nominee because he was insufficiently supportive of the death penalty. See 
Charles Babington & Joan Biskupic; Senate Rejects Judicial Nominee, Wash. Post, 
Oct. 6, 1999, at Al. 
20 Of course, there are groups, such as the American Civil Liberties Union, that do 
stand up against disproportionate criminal punishments. These groups, however, do 
not constitute an effective lobby capable of challenging the "tough on crime" dis-
course that pervades American politics. See infra notes 262-69 and accompanying 
text, explaining how the political process is not equipped to deal with claims of dis-
proportionate prison sentences. 
21 See William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. Con-
temp. Legal Issues 1, 20 (1996) ("A lot of constitutional theory has been shaped by 
the idea ... that constitutional law should aim to protect groups that find it hard or 
impossible to protect themselves through the political process. If ever such a world 
existed, the universe of criminal suspects is it"); see also DavidS. Mackey, Rational-
ity Versus Proportionality: Reconsidering the Constitutional Limits on Criminal 
Sanctions, 51 Tenn. L. Rev. 623, 643-44 n.126 (1984) (recognizing that public animos-
ity toward prisoners prevents their rights from being adequately protected by the 
legislative process). 
22 See BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 614-19 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing) (cataloging numerous recently enacted or proposed laws designed to limit 
punitive damages); Kimberly A. Pace, Recalibrating the Scales of Justice Through 
National Punitive Damages Refonn, 46 Am. U. L. Rev. 1573, 1589 (1997) ("Forty-six 
states either have prohibited punitive damages or have enacted legislation aimed at 
reducing their frequency and size."); see also infra Part IV.C.l. 
23 See P~ce, supra note 22, at 1589. 
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for the judiciary to exert its countermajoritarian weight24 in the 
criminal pwrishment area. Under political process theory, there-
fore, the Supreme Court has its proportionality jurisprudence 
backwards. 
Part I of this Note will review the Supreme Court's major deci-
sions m the areas of excessive criminal punishments and punitive 
damages. Part II will then explain that the Court's most recent de-
cisions-BMW of North America v. Gore,25 in which the Court 
struck down a punitive damages verdict as excessive, and Harmelin 
v. Michigan,26 in which the Court rejected a claim that a criminal 
punishment was disproportionate to the offense-announce more 
stringent proportionality review of punitive damages awards than 
of criminal punishments. Part III will review lower court decisions 
following Harmelin and BMW and demonstrate that lower courts 
have interpreted Harmelin to afford virtually no proportionality 
protection against excessive criminal punishments, while simulta-
neously interpreting BMW to require significant proportionality 
review of punitive damages verdicts. Part IV will first briefly argue 
that deprivations of liberty (criminal punishments) should be enti-
tled to more rigorous judicial review than deprivations of property 
(punitive damages awards). Part IV will then explore political 
process theory: the idea that courts should be reluctant to enter 
into the fray unless there has been a failure in the political process. 
Finally, this Note will conclude that the Supreme Court's propor-
tionality jurisprudence is backwards. Instead of affording greater 
protection against excessive punitive damages verdicts, the Court 
should concern itself with ensuring that criminal punishments are 
not disproportionate. 
24 For the classic depiction of the countermajoritarian difficulty, see Alexauder M. 
Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (1962). Although the idea that judicial review is 
countermajoritarian has pervaded the discourse, it is not universally accepted. See, 
e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 Yale 
L.J. 1013, 1050-51 (1984). 
25 517 u.s. 559 (1996). 
26 501 u.s. 957 (1991). 
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I. THE SUPREME COURT'S PROPORTIONALITY JURISPRUDENCE 
A. Proportionality Review of Excessive Prison Sentences 
A member of the Court first suggested that an excessively long 
criminal sentence could violate the Constitution in O'Neil v. Ver-
mont. 27 O'Neil was convicted of multiple counts of selling 
intoxicating liquor without authority, for which he faced a possible 
sentence of fifty-four years of hard labor. While a majority of the 
Court declined to hear O'Neil's appeal, Justice Stephen Field ar-
gued in dissent that a fifty-four year sentence for selling liquor 
without authority was excessive and hence cruel and unusual in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment.28 Specifically, Justice Field 
stated that the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment 
clause prevents punishments that inflict torture as well as "all pun-
ishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly 
disproportioned to the offences charged. "29 
Eighteen years after O'Neil, in Weems v. United States,30 four of 
the six participating Justices concluded that a punishment was dis-
proportionate and violative of the Eighth Amendment_l1 Weems, a 
public official in the Philippine~, was convicted of falsifying an offi-
cial public document.32 For this seemingly minor offense, Weems 
was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment and subjected to hard 
and painfullabor.33 Additionally, after his release, Weems was for-
bidden from becoming a parent, administering property, voting, or 
holding office; he was also sentenced to a life of surveillance.34 In 
finding this extremely punitive sentence to violate the Eighth 
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment,35 
the Weems Court noted that "it is a precept of justice that punish-
ment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense."36 
27 144 u.s. 323 (1892). 
28 See id. at 339-40 (Field, J., dissenting). The Eighth Amendment states, "Excessive 
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punish-
ments inflicted." U.S. Const. amend. VIII. 
29 O'Neil, 144 U.S. at 339-40 (Field, J., dissenting). 
30 217 u.s. 349 (1910). 
31 See id. at 382. 
32 See id. at 357. 
33 See id. at 358, 363--Q4. 
34 See id. at 364--Q5. 
35 See id. at 382. 
36 Id. at 367. 
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Seventy years later, in Rummel v. Estelle, 31 the Supreme Court 
backtracked from Weems and upheld a sentence of life imprison-
ment with the possibility of parole for a recidivist who had 
committed three nonviolent property felonies involving less than 
$230.38 The Rummel Court concluded that "one could argue with-
out fear of contradiction ... [that] the length of the sentence 
actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative."39 
The Rummel majority did, however, stop short of completely abdi-
cating judicial supervision of states' power to punish offenders. The 
Court noted in a footnote that a proportionality principle might 
come into play in extreme cases such as "if a legislature made over-
time parking a felony punishable by life imprisonment."40 
Less than two years later, in Hutto v. Davis, 41 the Court reaf-
firmed Rummel by issuing a per curiam opinion upholding a forty-
year sentence for possession with intent to distribute and distribu-
tion of approximately nine ounces of marijuana.42 Once again, the 
Court noted in a footnote that proportionality review might be 
proper in extreme cases.43 Nevertheless, the per curiam opinion re-
iterated that judicial review of prison sentences should be 
exceedingly rare because of the difficulty of comparing sentences 
and the need to avoid the imposition of the subjective views of in-
dividual Justices.44 
Despite the Court's admonitions in Davis and Rummel that pro-
portionality challenges to prison sentences should be exceedingly 
rare,45 the Court itself struck down a sentence as excessive only one 
year after Hutto v. Davis. In Solem v. Helm,46 the Court overturned 
'SI 445 u.s. 263 (1980). 
38 See id. at 265-66. 
39 Id. at 274. The decision in Weems, which seemed to contradict this statement, was 
distinguished because of the unusual conditions accompanying Weems's imprison-
ment. See id. at 274. 
40 Id. at 274 n.ll. 
41 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per curiam). 
42 See id. at 370-75. 
43 See id. at 374 n.3. 
44 See id. at 373-74. 
45 See id. at 373; Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272. 
46 463 U.S. 277 (1983). The Helm majority was composed of Justices William Bren-
nan, Thurgood Marshall, Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, and John Paul Stevens. See 
id. at 279. Justice Blackmun had previously voted with the majorities in Rummel v. 
Estelle and Hutto v. Davis. See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 264; Hutto, 454 U.S. at 370. 
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a punishment of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole 
for the commission of a seventh nonviolent offense.47 The Court 
concluded that the punishment was disproportionate because the 
length of the sentence was excessive.48 Writing for the Helm major-
. ity, Justice Lewis Powell first made clear that the principle that a 
punishment should be proportionate to the crime is deeply rooted 
in our nation's history.49 Having found that the punishment must be 
proportionate to the crime, the Court proceeded to promulgate a 
three-part objective test to determine whether prison sentences 
were disproportionate in violation of the Eighth Amendment.so 
Justice Powell stated that courts should look first "to the gravity of 
the offense and the harshness of the penalty."51 Second, courts 
should "compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in the 
same jurisdiction."s2 If more serious crimes are subject to the same 
or less serious penalties, Justice Powell explained, then that is evi-
dence that the penalty is disproportionate.s3 Fmally, courts should 
judge proportionality by "compar[ing] the sentences imposed for 
commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions."S4 The major-
ity did not mention that the Rummel and Davis Courts had 
explicitly rejected these types of "objective" criteria as too difficult 
to implement and for too easily disguising Justices' subjective opin-
ions.5s Instead, Justice J:>owell explained that there are widely 
shared views as to the seriousness of different crimes,s6 and while it 
may be hard to draw a line between sentences of different lengths, 
47 See Helm, 463 U.S. at 279. Helm had been convicted, on separate occasions, of 
three third-degree burglaries, obtaining money under false pretenses, grand larceny, 
driving while intoxicated, and passing a no-account check. See id. at 279-81. 
48 See id. at 303. 
49 See id. at 284. Justice Powell contended that Weems v. United States endorsed this 
proportionality principle. See id. at 286-87. 
sa See id. at 290-92. 
51 Id. at 290-91. 
52 Id. at 291. 
53 See id. 
54 Id. at 291-92. 
55 See, e.g., Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 373 (1982) (per curiam) ("[T]he excessive-
ness of one prison term as compared to another is invariably a subjective 
determination, there being no clear way to make 'any constitutional distinction be-
tween one term of years and a shorter or longer term of years."') (quoting Rummel v. 
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 275 (1980)). 
56 See Helm, 463 U.S. at 292. 
HeinOnline  -- 86 Va. L. Rev.  1259 2000
2000] Backwards Proportionality Jurisprudence 1259 
courts are frequently called upon to draw these types of difficult 
lines.57 
Applying its three-part proportionality test, the Court found that 
Hehn's sentence of life imprisonp1ent without the possibility of pa-
role was disproportionate.58 While recognizing that Hehn was a 
recidivist, the Court found that the gravity of Hehn's crime was 
minimal.59 An intrajurisdictional comparison of sentences imposed 
in South Dakota demonstrated that the other crimes which carried 
mandatory sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility 
of parole were more serious felonies, including murder, second and 
third convictions for treason, first-degree manslaughter, first-
degree arson, and kidnapping.60 Finally, an interjurisdictional com-
parison showed that only one other state (Nevada) permitted such 
a harsh punishment, and even there the sentence of life without pa-
role was not mandatory and had never been meted out for such a 
minor offense.61 
In announcing that punishment must be proportionate to the 
crime and in finding the length of Helm's sentence to be dispropor-
tionate, the Helm Court appeared to depart dramatically from 
Rummel's suggestion that the length of criminal sentences is a mat-
ter of legislative prerogative.62 Contrary to Rummel-which 
suggested that successful proportionality challenges to criminal 
punishments would be rare (and possibly nonexistent)-Helm 
seemed to suggest that the Eighth Amendment contains a rigorous 
proportionality requirement. The existence of this rigorous propor-
tionality review did not last long. 
Eight years after Helm, the Court retreated from its conclusion 
that prison sentences must be proportionate to the crime. In Har-
melin v. Michigan,63 a fractured majority, composed of Chief Justice 
57 See id. at 294. 
58 See id. at 303. 
59 See id. at 296. The Court remarked that passing a no-account check was "one of 
the most passive felonies a person could commit." Id. (internal qnotation marks omit-
ted). 
oo See id. at 298. 
61 See id. at 299-300. 
62 See id. at 307-10 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of disregarding 
Rummel's holding that the length of a sentence of imprisonment is a matter of legisla-
tive and not judicial discretion). 
63 501 u.s. 957 (1991). 
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William Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin 
Scalia, William Kennedy, and David Souter, rejected Ronnie Har-
melin's claim that a sentence of life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole was disproportionate for the crime of posses-
sion of more than 650 grams of cocaine.64 A majority of the Court 
was unable, however, to agree upon how proportionality review 
should be conducted. 
Justice Scalia, writing only for himself and Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, argued that the Court's conclusion in Solem v. Helm 
that the Eighth Amendment contains a proportionality guarantee 
was "simply wrong."65 Justice Scalia posited that as a historical mat-
ter the Eighth Amendment was only intended to prohibit cruel and 
unusual modes of punishment, not disproportionately long sen-
tences.66 He also criticized Helm's three-part test for determining 
disproportionate punishments, and argued that Helm's first prong 
was improper because it is too difficult for judges to assess objec-
tively whether the severity of the sanction is disproportionate to 
the gravity of the offense.67 Justice Scalia found the same fault with 
Helm's second prong, which required an intrajurisdictional com-
parison between the defendant's sentence and the sentence 
imposed on similar defendants in that jurisdiction; he concluded 
that there is no objective standard to judge if some offenses in a ju-
risdiction are more grave than others.68 Finally, Justice Scalia 
balked at Helm's third prong, which required an interjurisdictional 
comparison of the actual punishment to potential sentences the de-
fendant could have received in other jurisdictions. Justice Scalia 
contended that a state is entitled to criminalize and severely punish 
behavior that other states would punish mildly or not at all.69 
While Justice Scalia wrote the lead opinion in Harmelin, it was 
Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion-joined by Justices O'Connor 
and Souter-that was actually controlling. At the outset, Justice 
64 See id. at 996; id. at 1009 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
65 Id. at 965 (Opinion of Scalia, J.). 
66 See id. at 966-85 (Opinion of Scalia, J.). 
67 See id. at 987-88 (Opinion of Scalia, J.). Moreover, even if it were possible for 
judges to accnrately assess the severity of the punishment and the gravity of the of-
fense, Justice Scalia argued that such decisions are properly in the province of the 
legislature and not the courts. See id. (Opinion of Scalia, J.). 
68 See id. at 988-89 (Opinion of Scalia, J.). 
69 See id. at 989-90 (Opinion of Scalia, J.). 
HeinOnline  -- 86 Va. L. Rev.  1261 2000
2000] Backwards Proportionality Jurisprudence 1261 
Kennedy recognized that the Court's proportionality decisions 
"have not been clear or consistent in all respects."70 Justice Ken-
nedy nevertheless tried to reconcile the Court's past opinions by 
concluding that the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has 
recognized a "narrow proportionality principle. "71 More specifi-
cally, Justice Kennedy took a step back from Helm's conclusion 
that the crime and sentence must be proportionate, concluding in-
stead that the Eighth Amendment forbids only extreme sentences 
that are grossly disproportionate to the crime.72 Hence, strict pro-
portionality between the crime and the sentence is not required.73 
Justice Kennedy also backtracked from Helm's three-part pro-
portionality test, contending that none of the prongs themselves 
was intended to be dispositive.74 Justice Kennedy stated that courts 
should still undertake Helm's first prong by considering whether 
the crime and the accompanying sentence created an inference of 
gross disproportionality.75 However, if the court did not perceive 
gross disproportionality between the crime and the sentence then 
the second and third prongs of the Helm test-the intra jurisdictional 
and interjurisdictional comparisons of comparable punishments-
need not be undertaken.76 According to Justice Kennedy, this 
framework explained Weems, Rummel, Davis, and Helm: Intrajuris-
dictional and interjurisdictional analysis was undertaken in Weems 
and Helm to validate an initial inference of gross disproportional-
ity,n while no comparative analysis was undertaken in Rummel and 
Davis because there was no initial inference of gross disproportion-
ality.78 Applying this test to Harmelin's case, Justice Kennedy 
concluded that the magnitude of Harmelin's crime was so great that 
the punishment could not give rise to an inference of disproportion-
ality.79 Without such an inference, Harmelin's sentenc~ could be 
70 Id. at 996 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
11 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
72 See id. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
73 See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
74 See id. at 1004 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
75 See id. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
76 See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
77 See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
78 See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
79 See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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upheld without conducting intrajurisdictional or interjurisdictional 
comparisons of similar crimes and sentences.80 
Justices Byron White, Thurgood Marshall, Harry Blackmun, and 
John Paul Stevens dissented in Harmelin, concluding that a sen-
tence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the 
possession of over 650 grams of cocaine was disproportionate.81 
Justice White's dissent82 first took issue with Justice Scalia's conclu-
sion that the Eighth Amendment did not require proportionate 
punishments. Justice White argued that the history of the Eighth 
Amendment and the Court's interpretation of it in cases like 
Weems, Helm, and a number of death-penalty cases83 demonstrated 
that the Eighth Amendment affords a proportionality guarantee.84 
Justice White further criticized Justice Scalia for failing to take ac-
count of the hypothetical in Rummel in which a legislature makes 
overtime parking a felony punishable by life imprisonment without 
the possibility of parole.85 
Justice White also sharply disagreed with Justice Kennedy's plu-
rality opinion, noting that "Justice Kennedy's abandonment of the 
second and third factors set forth in Solem makes any attempt at an 
objective proportionality analysis futile."86 Justice White contended 
that intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional comparisons of simi-
80 See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
81 See id. at 1027 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 1028 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
82 Justice White's dissent was joined only by Justices Blackmun and Stevens. Justice 
Marshall wrote a separate dissent in which he agreed (for the most part) with Justice 
White's dissent. See id. at 1009 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 1027 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting). 
83 Justice White cited Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 187 (1976) (upholding the 
constitutionality of the death penalty but noting that the punishment must not be 
grossly out of proportion to the crime), Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) 
(striking down the death penalty for the rape of an adult woman because it was 
grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime), and Enmund v. Florida, 458 
U.S. 7'i!l2, 801 (1982) (striking down a felony-murder death sentence as disproportion-
ate for a getaway driver who had a minor role in the crime and had not intended to 
kill the victim). Justice White pointed out that it would make no sense to hold that the 
words "cruel and unusual" afford proportionality protection for death sentences but 
not for other types of sentences. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1013-14 (White, J., 
dissenting). 
84 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1009-16 (White, J., dissenting). 
as See id. at 1018 (White, J., dissenting). 
86 Id. at 1020 (White, J., dissenting). 
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lar crimes and sentences are the only way for judges to compare 
the gravity of the offense with the severity of the punishment.87 
Piecing together the various Harmelin opinions, it is clear that 
Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion is controlling.88 Six other Jus-
tices supported Justice Kennedy's conclusion that a narrow 
proportionality guarantee exists.89 Additionally, a majority of the 
Court supported Justice Kennedy's position that Helm's intrajuris-
dictional and interjurisdictional analyses should not be conducted 
in all but the rarest instances.90 While Justice Kennedy's concur-
rence recognized that a proportionality guarantee does exist, his 
opinion suggested that successful proportionality challenges to 
criminal punishments would be exceedingly rare.91 Thus, after a 
century of conflicting decisions, it appears that while proportional-
~n See id. at 1021 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White argued that intra jurisdictional 
and interjurisdictional comparisons proved that Harmelin's life sentence without the 
possibility of parole was disproportionate. The only crimes receiving comparable pun-
ishment in Michigan were first-degree murder and distribution of more than 650 
grams of narcotics, both of which are more serious offenses than Harmelin's crime. 
Additionally, Harmelin would not have been punished as harshly in any other state in 
the nation. See id. at 1025-27 (White, J., dissenting). 
83 See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) ("When a fragmented Court 
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five 
Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those 
Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.") (internal quo-
tation marks omitted); see also United States v. Van Winrow, 951 F.2d 1069, 1071 n.2 
(9th Cir. 1991) (applying Marks to the Harmelin decision); Les A. Martin, Note, Har-
melin v. Michigan-The Demise of the Eighth Amendment's Proportionality 
Guarantee, 38 Loy. L. Rev. 255, 272 (1992) ("Although only three Justices subscribed 
to the reasoning in [Justice Kennedy's] opinion, the four dissenting Justices would 
certainly ... call for the application of the grossly disproportionate test in lieu of no 
evaluation at all .... "). 
89 Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O'Connor and Souter, argued for a narrow 
proportionality principle. The dissenting Justices-White, Blackmun, Stevens, and 
Marshall-advocated a rigorous proportionality review. Hence at least seven Justices 
supported some level of proportionality guarantee. 
90 Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist would have eliminated the intra juris-
dictional and interjurisdictional comparisons in all instances, thus creating a five-
Justice majority-Scalia, Relmquist, Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter-for the propo-
sition tliat intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional comparisons need not be 
conducted in most cases. Conversely, Justices White, Blackmun, and Marshall advo-
cated using the entire Helm framework in every case, thus creating a seven-Justice 
majority-Blackmun, White, Marsliall, Stevens, Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter-
for the proposition that wlien tliere is an inference of gross disproportionality tlie 
Helm intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional comparisons must be conducted. 
91 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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ity review of excessive criminal punishments survives, successful 
challenges are nearly impossible.92 
B. Proponionality Review of Excessive Punitive Damages Awards 
Unlike constitutional challenges to excessive criminal punish-
J ments, which can be traced back over 100 years, constitutional 
challenges to excessive punitive damages awards are a fairly recent 
phenomenon. Even though punitive damages have been around for 
a long time,93 it was not until recently that the frequency and size of 
punitive damages verdicts increased dramatically.94 The explosion 
of punitive damages, not surprisingly, led to constitutional objec-
tions. In large part, these constitutional challenges find their 
genesis in a 1986 article by Professor John Calvin Jeffries, Jr.95 Pro-
fessor Jeffries posited that repetitive punitive damages awards 
arising out of a single course of conduct could amount to an exces-
sive fine in violation of the Eighth Amendment96 or could violate 
due process.97 In making the due process argument, Professor Jef-
fries first argued that multiple puuitive damages verdicts for the 
same course of conduct would amount to a double penalty and 
hence would violate the guarantee of fundamental fairness inher-
92 See Deborah M. Furhan, Note, Harmelin v. Michigan: Should the Existence of an 
Eighth Amendment Guarantee of Proportionate Prison Sentences Rest on the Fate of 
Titus Oates and the Dreaded Consequences of Overtime Parking?, 22 Sw. U. L. Rev. 
1133,1176 (1993) ("[I]n one fell swoop, the highest Court of this nation destroyed one 
hundred years of American common law that had rightly declared that the Supreme 
Court, under the Eighth Amendment, should function as a check against abuses of 
power by elected officials when setting criminal prison sentences."); Kelly A. Patch, 
Note, Harmelin v. Michigan: Is Proportionate Sentencing Merely Legislative Grace?, 
1992 Wis. L. Rev. 1697, 1723 ("[The Harmelin] Court has virtually eliminated any 
proportionality guarantee .... "). 
93 Punitive damages awards date back to eighteenth century common law. See Dor-
sey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 1, 12-20 (1982) (discussing the origins of puuitive damages); Note, Exemplary 
Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 517, 518 (1957). 
94 See supra note 4. A recent example is a California jury's award of almost $5 bil-
lion in punitive damages to a family burned because of the location of a gas tank in a 
GM car. See Sarah Tippit, Jury Awards $4.9 Billion in Car Crash, Pittsburgh Post-
Gazette, July 10,)999, at A1, available in 1999 WL 5282088. 
95 See Jeffries, supra note 4. 
96 See id. at 147-51. 
'17 See id. at 151-58. 
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ent in the Due Process Clause.98 Professor Jeffries then turned to 
history, particularly the Magna Carta, to assert that the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fifth Amendment was intended to incorporate a 
prohibition against excessive civil penalties.99 
Although the-Supreme Court rejected the suggestion that exces-
sive punitive damages could violate the Excessive Fines Clause of 
the Eighth Amendment100 (as well as the argument that punitive 
damages awards could violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the 
Fifth Amendmene01) the Court has, in a series of cases, embraced 
the idea that excessive punitive damages can violate due process. 
In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,un the Supreme 
Court upheld a punitive damages verdict against a due process 
challenge that the verdict was excessive. In doing so, however, the 
Court made clear for the first time that excessive punitive damages 
verdicts could be violative of due process.103 
98 See id. at 153. 
99 See id. at 156-58. 
100 See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 263-64 (1989) 
("Whatever the outer confines of the [Excessive Fines] Clause's reach may be, we 
now decide only that it does not constrain an award of money damages in a civil suit 
when the government neither has prosecuted the action nor has any right to receive a 
share of the damages awarded."). Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Stevens, dis-
sented from the Court's conclusion that punitive damages do not come within the 
purview of the Excessive Fines Clause, arguing as a historical matter that the clause 
did place limits on punitive damages. See id. at 287-97 (O'Connor, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). More interesting, however, was Justice O'Connor's con-
tention that the Court should adopt the Solem v. Helm framework to determine which 
punitive damages awards amounted to excessive fines. See id. at 300-01 (O'Connor, 
J., concurring and dissenting in part). The inconsistency of Justice O'Connor's posi-
tion is explained infra at note 157. 
101 See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 451 (1989) ("[N]othing in today's opin-
ion precludes a private party from filing a civil suit seeking damages for conduct that 
previously was the subject of criminal prosecution and punishment. The protections 
of the Double Jeopardy Clause are not triggered by litigation between private par-
ties.") (citation omitted). 
102 499 U.S.1 (1991). 
103 See id. at 18. Prior to Haslip, the Court had hinted that excessive punitive dam-
ages verdicts could be constitutionally infirm on due process grounds. See Browning-
Fe"is, 492 U.S. at 276 ("The parties agree that due process imposes some limits on 
jury awards of punitive damages .... "); id. at 280 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Several 
of our decisions indicate that even where a statute sets a range of possible civil dam-
ages that may be awarded to a private litigant, the Due Process Clause forbids 
damages awards that are 'grossly excessive .... "'). Nevertheless, the Court refused to 
address squarely the applicability of the Due Process Clause to excessive punitive 
damages claims prior to Haslip. See Bankers Life & Ca_s. Co., v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 
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In 1981 au agent of Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company em-
bezzled insurance premiums, which resulted in the cancellation of 
Cleopatra Haslip's insurance and an adverse effect on her credit.104 
An Alabama jury awarded Haslip $1,040,000 in general damages, 
likely including $200,000 in compensatory damages and $840,000 in 
punitive damages.105 Pacific Mutual appealed the verdict, contend-
ing that unlimited jury discretion in awarding punitive damages 
violated due process/06 
Writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun107 first explained that 
the common-law method of allowing juries to assess punitive dam-
ages did not itself violate due process/08 and further that the 
punitive damages award assessed against Pacific Mutual did not 
violate due process.109 While recognizing that unlimited jury discre-
tion might result in extreme verdicts, Justice Blackmun stated that 
the Court could not draw a mathematical bright line between con-
stitutionally acceptable and constitutionally unacceptable punitive 
damages verdicts.110 The Court did remark, however, that the puni-
tive damages award-which was four times greater than the 
compensatory damages-was "close to the line."111 Therefore, 
while the Haslip Court focused primarily on procedural due proc-
ess, the Court's final comment that a four-to-one punitive-to-
compensatory damages ratio came "close to the line" implied the 
existence of a substantive guarantee against excessive punitive 
damages. 
Two years after Haslip, in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Re-
sources Corp.,112 a plurality of the Court expressly recognized what 
71,76-80 (1988) (declining to decide whether the Due Process Clause placed limits on 
punitive damages because the issue had not been raised in state court); Aetna Life 
Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828-29 (1986) (refusing to decide the applicability of 
the Due Process Clause because the case could be resolved on narrower grounds). 
1M See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 4-5. 
1os See id. at 7 n.2. 
ul6 See id. at 7. 
107 Justice Blackmun's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Relmquist and Justices 
White, Marshall, and Stevens. Justices Scalia and Kennedy also voted with the major-
ity but concurred in separate opinions. Justice O'Connor issued a dissenting opinion. 
Justice Souter did not participate in Haslip. See id. at 2. 
1138 Se.e id. at 17. 
109 See id. at 19. 
110 See id. at 18. 
111 Id. at 23. 
112 509 u.s. 443 (1993). 
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had been implied in Haslip: The Due Process Clause affords sub-
stantive protection against excessive punitive damages awards. 
During a property dispute, TXO frivolously alleged a cloud on the 
property's title in an attempt to defraud Alliance Resources.113 Al-
though Alliance Resources suffered only $19,000 in actual 
damages, the jury awarded $10 million in punitive damages, a ratio 
of 1 to 526.114 Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justice Blackmun, sought to determine if the punitive damages 
. awarded were so "'grossly excessive' as to violate the. substantive 
component of the Due Process Clause."115 Although Justice Stevens 
recognized that the 526-to-1 punitive-to-compensatory damages ra-
tio was high (and was certainly higher than the four-to-one ratio 
that the Haslip Court had called "close to the line"), the Court 
concluded that the award was not grossly excessive.116 
Shortly after TX0,111 in BMW of North America v. Gore,118 a 
majority of the Court struck down a punitive damages award as 
grossly excessive. Building on Haslip and TXO, a majority of the 
Court explicitly recognized a substantive due process protection 
against unreasonable punitive damages awards. 
Dr. Ira Gore, Jr., purchased an automobile from BMW of North 
America ("BMW"). After he discovered that BMW had repainted 
the car after the paint was damaged in transit, 119 Gore sued BMW 
113 See id. at 447-51 (Opinion of Stevens, J.). 
114 See id. at 451, 453 (Opinion of Stevens, J. ). 
ns Id. at 458 (Opinion of Stevens, J.). 
116 See id. at 460--62 (Opinion of Stevens, J.). Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas 
joined Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun and Stevens to uphold the pu-
nitive damages verdict. However, Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas adamantly 
opposed the creation of a substantive due process protection against unreasonable 
punitive damages. See id. at 470-72 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
117 One year after TXO, the Court decided another excessive punitive damages case, 
Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994). Oberg had been awarded $5 million 
in punitive damages by an Oregon jury for an injury resulting from a design defect in 
his three-wheel Honda vehicle. See id. at 418. Honda alleged that the $5 million puni-
tive damages verdict-an award five times Oberg's compensatory damages-was 
violative of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. See id. The Court reit-
erated that the Constitution places substantive limits on the size of punitive damages 
awards. Explaining that post-trial review of punitive damages awards is a key proce-
dural safeguard to protect big business from jury bias, the Court struck down the 
award because Oregon lacked such post-trial review. See id. at 432. 
118 517 u.s. 559 (1996). 
119 See id. at 563. 
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for the depreciation in value of his car. An Alabama jury awarded 
him $4,000 in compensatory damages and $4 million in punitive 
damages;120 the Alabama Supreme Court reduced the punitive 
damages award to $2 million.121 
On appeal, a majority of the Supreme Coure22 announced, for 
the first time, that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment affords substantive protection against grossly exces-
sive ·punitive damages awards.123 Writing for the Court, Justice 
Stevens established three guideposts to determine when punitive 
damages verdicts are so excessive as to be unconstitutional. First, a 
court should look to the degree of reprehensibility of the conduct 
that gave rise to the punitive award.124 For example, trickery and 
deceit are more reprehensible than negligence.125 Second, courts 
should compare the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages.126 
Justice Stevens noted, however, as the Court had in Haslip, that no 
mathematical formula can determine when a ratio of punitive to 
compensatory damages is excessive; instead, case-by-case analysis 
is necessary.127 Third and finally, the majority instructed that puni-
tive damages awards should be compared with existing civil or 
criminal sanctions for comparable misconduct.128 
All three guideposts suggested that the punitive damages award 
in BMW v. Gore was grossly excessive. The Court found that 
BMW's actions did not injure anyone and were not reprehensi-
ble,129 that the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages-a ratio 
of 500 to 1-was extremely high130 (and greater than the ratio in 
both Haslip and TXOm), and that the $2 million punitive damages 
120 See id. at 565. 
121 See id. at 567. 
122 The majority was composed of Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and 
BreyeLSeeid.at561. 
123 See id. at 568. 
124 See id. at 575. 
125 See id. at 576. 
126 See id. at 580. 
127 See id. at 582-83. 
128 See id. at 583. 
129 See id. at 576. 
130 See id. at 582. 
131 The Court stated that the ratio in TXO had only been ten to one, even though the 
actual punitive damages award was 526 times greater than the compensatory dam-
ages. See id. at 581. Justice Stevens explained that the $10 million punitive damages 
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verdict was substantially greater than any statutory fine that could 
have been imposed, in Alabama or any other jurisdiction, for 
BMW's conduct.132 As a result, the Supreme Court struck down the 
$2 million punitive damages verdict as unconstitutional.133 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
dissented. Justice Ginsburg argued that review of state punitive 
damages verdicts was an area traditionally left to the states and 
that the federal courts should not intervene.134 Moreover, Justice 
Ginsburg pointed out that numerous state legislatures had enacted 
or had proposed legislation to limit large punitive damages 
awards.135 In light of this legislative activity, Justice Ginsburg con-
cluded that the Court should defer to the states rather than involve 
the federal courts.136 
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, also dissented, 
remarking, "I do not regard the Fourteenth Amendment's Due 
Process Clause as a secret repository of substantive guarantees 
against 'unfairness."'137 While acknowledging that the Fourteenth 
Amendment provides an opportunity for defendants to contest the 
reasonableness of a punitive damages verdict in state court, Justice 
Scalia contended that the Fourteenth Amendment does not qffer a 
federal guarantee that the award actually be reasonable.138 Finally, 
verdict in TXO had to be considered in context with the potential harm likely to re-
sult from TXO's conduct. Even though only $19,000 in actual harm was suffered, the 
potential harm would have been at minimum $1 million. As a result, the BMW Court 
determined that the TXO punitive damages award of $10 million was only ten times 
greater than the compensatory damages. See id. 
m See id. at 584. 
tll See id. at 585-86. Justice Breyer, joined by Justices O'Connor and Souter, con-
curred, adding that Alabama's lack of procedural safeguards coupled with the "gross 
excessiveness" of the award was sufficient to surmount the otherwise "strong pre-
sumption of validity" that is given to punitive damages awards. See id. at 596-97 
(Breyer, J., concurring). 
134 See id. at 607 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
135 See id. at 614-19 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg added an appendix 
to her dissent listing twenty-five state laws (or proposed laws) designed to limit puni-
tive damages. These laws included caps on punitive damages, allocation of portions of 
punitive damages awards to state agencies, and bifurcation of the liability and puni-
tive damages portions of trials. See infra Part IV.C.1 for an explanation of how this 
flurry of legislative activity militates against the Court reaching out to conduct exces-
siveness review of punitive damages verdicts. ' 
136 See BMW, 517 U.S. at 607 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
137 ld. at 598-99 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
138 See id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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Justice Scalia criticized the majority for announcing a substantive 
due process protection against excessive punitive damages without 
offering sufficient guidance to other courts on what constitutes an 
acceptable level of punitive damages.139 
Regardless of whether the dissenters were correct in arguing that 
review of punitive damages awards is a matter better left to legisla-
tures, it is clear that Justice Scalia validly criticized the majority for 
offering malleable guideposts that failed to provide lower courts 
with sufficient guidance. Even though the three guideposts in 
BMW appear to offer an objective test providing lower courts with 
guidance, in actuality the guideposts are quite vague.140 The first 
BMW benchmark, which instructs courts to assess the reprehensi-
bility of the defendant's conduct, forces judges to make almost 
entirely subjective determinations. The Court's explanation that in-
tentional torts are more reprehensible than negligent ones affords 
lower courts neither help nor constraints in deciding if the conduct 
at issue is reprehensible enough to merit a large punitive damages 
award. The second and third guideposts-comparing the punitive 
damages to the compensatory damages and comparing the punitive 
damages to any potential civil or criminal sanction-are also sub-
jective to a large degree.141 For instance, since there is no bright line 
rule, one court is free to determine that a punitive to compensatory 
damages ratio of 300 to 1 is not disproportionate while another 
court could find that a ratio of 30 to 1 is excessive. As such, not 
only are the three guideposts vague, they also provide judges with 
139 See id. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
140 See Peter J. Sajevic, Case Note, Failing the Smell Test: Punitive Damages Awards 
Raise the United States Supreme Court's Suspicious Judicial Eyebrow in BMW of 
North America, Inc. v. Gore, 20 Hamline L. Rev. 507, 538 (1996) ("[T]he Court's 
guideposts [in BMW] symbolize the Court's current role in the punitive damage 
arena: murky and vague."). 
141 See BMW, 517 U.S. at 605 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he 'guideposts' mark a 
road to nowhere .•.. "); Neil B. Stekloff, Note, Raising Five Eyebrows: Substantive 
Due Process Review of Punitive Damages Awards After BMW v. Gore, 29 Conn. L. 
Rev. 1797, 1817 (1997) ("While they may not 'mark a road to nowhere,' each guide-
post is far too subjective and malleable to be meaningful beyond the facts of BMW v. 
Gore."); Paul M. Sykes, Note, Marking a Road to Nowhere? Supreme Court Sets Pu-
nitive Damages Guideposts in BMW v. Gore, 75 N.C. L. Rev. 1084, 1114 (1997) 
("[T]he BMW standard is in many ways subjective and requires an ad hoc determina-
tion of constitutionality .... "). 
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wide latitude to uphold or strike down punitive damages awards as 
they see fie42 
Thus, in the punitive damages area, the Court has not only found 
a substantive due process protection against excessive punitive 
damages awards, it has also empowered lower courts with wide dis-
cretion to strike down punitive damages verdicts. 
II. COMPARING PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW OF EXCESSIVE 
CRIMINAL PUNISHMENTS WITH REVIEW OF 
EXCESSIVE PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS 
The Supreme Court's decisions in Harmelin v. Michigan and 
BMW v. Gore announce different levels of proportionality review 
for criminal punishments and punitive damages awards. On the 
one hand, the Court has set the bar for successful proportionality 
challenges to criminal punishments at an impossibly high level. On 
the other hand, the Court has promulgated a vague but potentially 
more rigorous review of punitive damages that affords lower courts 
the opportunity to strike down excessive punitive damages verdicts 
with ease. 
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Harmelin-widely rec-
ognized as the holding143-bluntly stated, "The Eighth Amendment 
does not require strict proportionality between crime and sen-
tence."144 Since the Eighth Amendment forbids only extreme 
sentences that are "grossly disproportionate," Justice Kennedy 
opined that "successful challenges to the proportionality of particu-
lar sentences [are] exceedingly rare."145 Having announced that 
there could be few, if any, successful excessiveness challenges to a 
criminal punishment, Justice Kennedy promulgated a test whereby 
lower courts easily could reject proportionality claims with the 
142 See Jim Davis II, Note, BMW v. Gore: Why the States (Not the U.S. Supreme 
Court) Should Review Substantive Due Process Challenges to Large Punitive Dam-
age Awards, 46 U. Kan. L. Rev. 395,413 (1998) ("The lower courts' initial and varied 
interpretations of BMW indicate the three guideposts may 'provide no real guidance 
at all' and may merely arm judges with a subjective framework (endorsed by the Su-
preme Court of the United States) that they can manipulate to justify practically any 
desired judgment."). 
143 See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
144 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
14s Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263,272 (1980)) 
(emphasis added). 1 
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simple aud subjective conclusion that the punishment does not 
seem too severe for the gravity of the offense. Courts no longer 
need to consider whether the defendant is being punished more 
harshly than other individuals in that jurisdiction or more harshly 
than he would be punished in other states. In short, unless a judge 
believes that a punishment is so outrageous as not to be commen-
surate to the crime, the court should dispose of the proportionality 
challenge without any further inquiry/46 
· Moreover, given the facts and the disposition of Harmelin itself, 
the possibility that a court could reasonably conclude that a pun-
ishment is so outrageous as to be grossly disproportionate to the 
crime is unlikely. In Harmelin, the Supreme Court upheld Har-
melin's sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole-the most severe punishment possible in the State of 
Michigan-for mere possession of 672 grams of cocaine.147 Any 
judge faced with a punishment which she believes might create an 
inference of gross disproportionality will likely conclude otherwise 
once she determines that the punishment at hand is no more dis-
proportionate than the one upheld in Harmelin.148 In short, after 
Harmelin, the prospects that defendants can make successful pro-
portionality challenges to criminal punishments are bleak. 
Conversely, after BMW v. Gore, it seems clear that civil defen-
dants can make successful proportionality challenges to punitive 
146 Unfortunately, many judges will not be willing to find that a punishment enacted 
by a popularly elected legislature creates an inference of gross disproportionality. At 
the state level, many judges are elected and must perpetuate an image that they are 
"tough on crime." If the Supreme Court does not require rigorous Eighth Amend-
ment proportionality analysis of criminal punishments, it is difficult to believe that 
elected state judges will take it upon themselves to conduct rigorous analysis. Faced 
with the need to be "tough on crime," and a proportionality test that allows easy af-
firmation of criminal punishments, some elected state judges may use the Harmelin 
test to affirm punishments without hesitation. For a discussion of the problem of judi-
cial review of punishments-albeit capital punishments-and the interplay of politics, 
see Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Decid-
ing Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. 
Rev. 759 (1995). 
147 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996. 
148 See, e.g., United States v. Mack, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 26846, at *8-9 (6th Cir. 
Oct. 15, 1998} ("Furthermore, if the life sentence for the possession of 672 grams of 
cocaine in Harmelin v. Michigan was constitutional, the same punishment for a crime 
involving fifty kilograms of cocaine also must be constitutional."} (internal citations 
omitted); see also infra note 160 for additional examples. 
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damages verdicts. Unlike in the criminal punishment context, 
where the Court announced that successful proportionality chal-
lenges would be exceedingly rare, the BMW Court found an 
unqualified substantive due process protection against excessive 
punitive damages awards.149 'fP.e Court made no effort to limit this 
new right: Instead, the Court simply concluded that the Due Proc-
ess Clause protects defendants against excessive punitive damages 
verdicts. Thus, the scope of the right to reasonable punitive dam-
ages awards created in BMW is more expansive than the limited 
protection against grossly disproportionate criminal punishments 
that the Court grudgingly recognized in Harmelin. 
Clear evidence of this can be found in the $2 million punitive 
damages verdict struck down in BMW itself. While $2 million is 
certainly a sizable sum of money, it pales in comparison to the 
multi-million or even billion-dollar punitive damages awards 
handed down in recent years.150 Thus, comparatively speaking, the 
BMW Court struck down a "mild" excessive punitive damages 
award. To make a more applicable-though admittedly rough-
comparison, the $2 million punitive damages award struck down in 
BMW might be akin to a Court striking down a prison sentence of 
five or ten years for possession of narcotics.151 Given that the Su-
preme Court has been unwilling to find criminal sentences of five 
or ten years (or even life sentences) to be disproportionate, the 
Court's decision to strike down a comparatively "mild" excessive 
punitive damages award signals more rigorous proportionality re-
view of punitive damages awards. 
The three BMW guideposts reinforce this conclusion. Unlike the 
Harmelin test for criminal punishments, the BMW framework re-
quires courts to assess the reprehensibility of the defendant's 
conduct, as well as the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages 
and the degree of criminal or civil sanctions that could be imposed 
for the defendant's misconduct. The latter two BMW guideposts 
require courts to measure objective factors before disposing of a 
proportionality challenge; Harmelin does not require courts to con-
sider similar objective factors in proportionality challenges to 
149 See supra notes 118-42 and accompanying text. 
tso See supra note 4. 
151 I thank Professor William Stuntz for making this point to me. 
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criminal punishments (and in fact the Court specifically rejected 
such objective benchmarks by replacing the Helm framework with 
the Harmelin test). 
Taken alone, the presence of objective guideposts to measure 
the proportionality of punitive damages awards seems to indicate 
that punitive damages verdicts are subject to rigorous review. In-
terestingly, however, it is the vagueness of the objective guideposts 
in BMW that provides for truly rigorous proportionality review of 
punitive damages by giving lower courts great flexibility. For in-
stance, the second guidepost under BMW is an analysis of the ratio 
of punitive to compensatory damages. Since the Supreme Court re-
fused to draw a mathematical bright line defining what ratio of 
punitive to compensatory damages is unacceptable,152 lower courts 
have discretion to determine what ratios are unconstitutionally ex-
cessive. Thus, one court could strike down a punitive damages 
verdict thirty times higher than the compensatory damages even 
though another court might conclude that a 300-to-1 ratio was 
permissible. Absent a mathematical bright line, the BMW Court 
gave lower courts tremendous flexibility to assess the proportional-
ity of punitive damages awards and to utilize this flexibility to 
strike down punitive damages verdicts. 
The creation of an unqualified substantive due process right to 
reasonable punitive damages verdicts and malleable guideposts 
that afford lower courts flexibility to strike down punitive damages 
verdicts demonstrates that the Supreme Court has afforded rigor-
ous proportionality review to punitive damages awards. 
Conversely, in the criminal punishment area, the Court has explic-
itly stated that successful challenges to the proportionality of 
punishments will be exceedingly rare, and the Court has instructed 
lower courts to dispose of such challenges without even consulting 
any objective criteria. It thus seems clear that the Supreme Court 
has afforded much more rigorous proportionality review to excessive 
punitive damages awards than to excessive criminal punishments. 
In spite of its differing treatment of criminal punishments and 
punitive damages awards, the Supreme Court has not offered a 
152 See BMW, 517 U.S. at 582-83 ("We need not, and indeed we cannot, draw a 
mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and the constitu-
tionally unacceptable that would fit every case.") (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18). 
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consistent explanation of why punitive damages verdicts should re-
ceive more rigorous proportionality review than criminal 
punishments. The Court's explanation for declining to conduct rig-
orous proportionality review of potentially excessive criminal 
sentences is based, in part, on federalism concerns. Justice Ken-
nedy remarked in Harmelin that "the fixing of prison terms for 
specific crimes involves a substantive penological judgment that, as 
a general matter, is 'properly within the province of legislatures, 
not courts.'"153 As such, it is "not to be interfered with lightly."154 In 
the punitive damages area, the Court has completely ignored simi-
lar federalism concerns. The BMW decision created a federal 
substantive due process right to reasonable punitive damages ver-
dicts and in doing so it subordinated the judgments of state courts 
and state juries.155 Additionally, by imposing a federal right to rea-
sonable punitive damages verdicts, the Court has invaded the 
province of the state legislatures that might have passed (or declined 
to pass) laws limiting punitive damages awards.156 By ignoring the in-
terests of state juries, courts, and legislatures, the BMW Court 
showed little regard for the federalism concerns that the Court had 
relied upon only a few years earlier in Harmelin, when declining to 
review rigorously the proportionality of criminal punishments. 
Thus, not only does the Supreme Court afford more rigorous 
proportionality review to punitive damages verdicts than to exces-
sive criminal punishments, it has also failed to explain why one 
area of law is entitled to more rigorous review than the other.157 
153 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998 (1991) (Kennedy, J. concurring) (citing Rummel v. 
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 275-76 (1980)). 
154 Id. at 1000 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 
349, 379 (1910)). 
155 See BMW, 517 U.S. at 600 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
156 See id. at 607 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
157 Justice O'Connor's jurisprudence demonstrates an even clearer example of in-
consistency in proportionality review. In both Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 
(1991), and Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), Justice O'Connor voted against ob-
jective intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional comparisons of potentially excessive 
criminal punishments. But Justice O'Connor twice voted to conduct intrajurisdic-
tional and interjurisdictional comparisons of potentially excessive punitive damages 
awards. See TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 482 
(1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 
257, 300-01 (1989) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor thus seemed willing 
to conduct vigorous comparative review of punitive damages awards, yet she was un-
willing to undertake the same type of objective review of criminal punishments. Like 
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III. THE PROOF Is IN THE PROGENY: LOWER COURT 
PROPORTIONALITY DECISIONS AFTER 
HARMELIN AND BMW 
An analysis of lower court decisions following Harmelin and 
BMW reinforces the conclusion that punitive damages verdicts are 
afforded greater proportionality review than potentially excessive 
criminal punishments. Lower courts have rejected hundreds of 
proportionality challenges to criminal punishments; only two courts 
have relied on Harmelin to find punishments to be disproportionate.158 
Moreover, the two courts that struck down punishments as dispropor-
tionate arguably did so only after misapplying Harmelin. Conversely, 
after BMW v. Gore, proportionality review of potentially excessive 
punitive damages awards is alive and well. Lower courts have seri-
ously analyzed many punitive damages verdicts and in a number of 
cases have found the awards to be unconstitutionally excessive. 
A. Excessive Criminal Punishment Cases 
In the nine years since Harmelin, lower courts have interpreted 
that decision narrowly and have primarily rejected proportionality 
challenges to excessive punishments on two rationales. First, and 
most simply, a number of courts have upheld appellants' punish-
ments on the grounds that their offenses were more serious than 
Harmelin's or that their punishments were less severe.159 Second, 
the Court as a whole, Justice O'Connor offered no explanation for this differing 
treatment of punitive damages and criminal punishments. 
158 See State v. Bartlett, 830 P.2d 823, 832 (Ariz. 1992); State v. Bonner, 577 N.W.2d 
575, 581 (S.D. 1998). 
159 See Wayne A. Logan, Proportionality and Punishment: Imposing Life Without 
Parole on Juveniles, 33 Wake Forest L. Rev. 681, 703 n.109 (1998) ("Not surprisingly, 
the Supreme Court's decisions approving sentences of life (Rummel) and L WOP 
(Harmelin) for nonviolent recidivist acts and drug possession, respectively, have been 
used as 'benchmarks' to readily deny proportionality challenges to heavy sentences 
for violent crime."). For a few (of many) examples, see United States v. Mack, 1998 
U.S. App. LEXIS 26846, at *8-9 (6th Cir. Oct. 15, 1998) ("Furthermore, if the life 
sentence for the possession of 672 grams of cocaine in Harmelin v. Michigan was con-
stitutional, the same punishment for a crime involving fifty kilograms of cocaine also 
must be constitutional.") (citations omitted); United States v. Van Winrow, 951 F.2d 
1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Winrow was convicted of an offense as serious as the of-
fense in Harmelin. We are therefore bound by Harme/in to hold a mandatory 
sentence of life without parole was not unconstitutionally disproportionate to Win-
row's offense."); United States v. Dunson, 940 F.2d 989, 995 (6th Cir. 1991) ("If the 
life sentence intposed in Harmelin was constitutional, it follows a fortiori that Mr. 
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and more commonly, a majority of courts have disposed of dispro-
portionality challenges by following Justice Kennedy's concurring 
opinion in Harmelin and concluding that defendants' punishments 
did not create inferences of gross disproportionality. This latter 
category can be divided into two subcategories: cases in which 
courts undertook substantial analysis to conclude that the punish-
ment did not appear grossly disproportionate,160 and cases in which 
courts curtly concluded, without any substantive analysis, that the 
defendants' challenges were not disproportionate under Har-
melin.161 
In the aftermath of Harmelin, lower courts have upheld many 
arguably disproportionate punishments. For instance, a Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals panel relied on Harmelin to affirm a ten-year 
sentence for intent to sell three ounces of marijuana.162 Similarly, 
the District Court for the District of Columbia upheld a thirty-year 
sentence for a recidivist convicted of possession of eight grams of 
narcotics.163 A Texas appeals court relied on Harmelin to uphold a 
five-year sentence for a nonviolent offender convicted of second-
degree burglary of habitation.164 Harmelin also provided the impe-
tus for a Missouri appeals court to uphold an eighty-year sentence 
Dunson's 20-year sentence [for possession and intent to distribute seven kilograms of 
cocaine] is constitutional."); State v. Silverman, 977 P.2d 1186 (Or. App. 1999) (up-
holding a 75-month sentence for first-degree sexual abuse of a child after comparing 
the offense to Harmelin). 
160 See, e.g., United States v. Bland, 961 F.2d 123, 129 (9th Cir. 1992) (reviewing the 
government's interest in punishing repeat offenders and the defendant's 13 prior vio-
lent felonies to conclude that a sentence of life without parole for the crime of being a 
felon in possession of a firearm does not create an inference of gross disproportional-
ity); United States v. Hickey, 822 F. Supp. 408, 411 (B.D. Mich. 1993) (analyzing the 
Congressional purpose behind long prison sentences for repeat drug offenders and 
concluding that there is no extreme disparity between a sentence of life imprisonment 
and the crime of distributing drugs near a school). 
161 See, e.g., Porter v. Bums, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 8385, at *3 (9th Cir. Apr. 27, 
1998) (rejecting defendant's disproportionality challenge to a 10-year sentence for in-
tent to sell less than three grams of marijuana simply because it "fails under Harmelin 
v. Michigan"); United States v. Morse, 983 F.2d 851, 855 (8th Cir. 1993) (concluding 
without analysis that a 36-month sentence for possession of unauthorized credit cards 
with intent to defraud is not grossly disproportionate); State v. Robertson, 939 P.2d 
863, 865 (Idaho Ct. App. 1997) (upholding a life sentence for second-degree murder 
after stating only that "[u]pon review of the entire record presented, we conclude that 
the sentence imposed under the facts of this case is not grossly disproportionate"). 
162 See Porter, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 8385 at *4. 
163 See United States v. Spencer, 817 F. Supp. 176 (D.D.C. 1993). 
161 See Sullivan v. State, 975 S.W .2d 755, 757-58 (Tex. Ct. App.1998). 
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for a recidivist convicted of two daytime burglaries.165 Despite a 
plethora of cases meting out lengthy punishments for arguably mi-
nor crimes, only two 1 courts have struck down punishments as 
disproportionate in the nine years since Harmelin. Perhaps more 
telling than the small number is the fact that both of those cases 
misinterpreted Harmelin. Under a proper Harmelin analysis those 
two "excessive" punishments might well have been upheld. 
In State v. Bartlett,166 the Arizona Supreme Court relied on Har-
melin to strike down a forty-year sentence for two statutory rape 
convictions. Rather than asking whether a forty-year sentence cre-
ated an inference of gross disproportionality, and only then 
proceeding to intrajurisdictional and mterjurisdictional compari-
sons, the Arizona Supreme Court immediately undertook a 
searching review of the merits of Bartlett's punishment. The court 
observed that Bartlett's offenses were nonviolent and that the 
trend in the law was to construe statutory rape as a less serious 
crime.167 Under a proper reading of Harrnelin, however, the court 
should not have considered these factors. Since statutory rape is a 
serious offense, one could easily conclude that a forty-year sen-
tence for two convictions does not create an inference of gross 
disproportionality.168 Without such an inference, Harmelin instructs 
lower courts to end the inquiry and to uphold the sentence. As 
such, a proper reading of Harmelin required the court to uphold 
Bartlett's sentence. 
The same flaw occurred in the South Dakota Supreme Court's 
decision in State v. Bonner.169 In Bonner, the court found a fifteen-
year sentence for second-degree burglary to be unconstitutionally 
excessive.170 The court established an inference of gross dispropor-
tionality by finding that Bonner's two codefendants received 
substantially less punishment and that South Dakota punished 
165 See State v. Williams, 936 S.W.2d 828, 829 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996). 
166 830 P.2d 823 (Ariz. 1992). 
167 See id. at 828-29. 
168 See id. at 835 (Corocan, J., dissenting) ("I believe that the sentences imposed in 
this case are not grossly disproportionate to the offenses committed in light of the 
threat posed to the individual and to society by engaging in sexual misconduct with 
children."). 
169 577 N.W.2d 575 (S.D. 1998). 
170 See id. at 581. 
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more serious offenses with shorter prison terms.171 Such findings, 
however, result from intrajurisdictional comparisons that the court 
should not undertake unless it already has found an inference of 
gross disproportionality. Thus, the information about Bonner's co-
defendants and the comparison of other punishments in South 
Dakota should not have been considered unless the court was con-
vinced, in the abstract, that a fifteen-year sentence for second-
degree burglary appeared grossly disproportionate. Hence, as an-
other commentator has observed, the result in Bonner was 
probably erroneous.172 
The Harmelin progeny demonstrate that the Supreme Court has 
not afforded rigorous proportionality review of criminal punish-
ments. First, and most importantly, courts have rejected hundreds 
of proportionality challenges-including some legitimate chal-
lenges-to criminal punishments under the Harmelin framework. 
Second, the only two post-Harmelin findings of disproportionate 
punishment were the result of misapplication173 of the Harmelin 
framework and probably should have been upheld. As such, the 
evidence demonstrates that virtually no appellate protection 
against disproportionate criminal punishments exists. 
B. Excessive Punitive Damages Cases 
While Harmelin has rendered proportionality review of criminal 
punishments dead in the lowe~ courts, BMW v. Gore has afforded 
those same courts wide latitude to determine _that excessive puni-
m See id. at 581--82. 
msee Joel E. Hunter, Note, State v. Bonner: In Search of an Objective Eighth 
Amendment Analysis for "Cruel and Unusual Punishment" in South Dakota, 44 S.D. 
L. Rev. 399, 428 (1999) ("If, however, the [Bonner] court had strictly constrained its 
analysis to the test supplied by Justice Kennedy in Harmelin, a different result would 
have invariably been reached."). 
173 Bartlett and Bonner are not the only cases to apply the Harmelin framework in-
correctly; other courts have continued to conduct intrajurisdictional and 
interjurisdictional comparisons without first finding an inference of gross dispropor-
tionality. See United States v. Kratsas, 45 F.3d 63 (4th Cir. 1995) (undertaking the full 
Helm test); United States v. D'Anjou, 16 F.3d 604 (4th Cir. 1994) (same); United 
States v. Angulo-Lopez, 7 F.3d 1506 (lOth Cir. 1993) (undertaking a very limited 
Helm analysis); United States v. Lowden, 955 F.2d 128 (1st Cir. 1992) (applying an 
interjurisdictional comparison); State v. Price, 721 So. 2d 511 (La. Ct. App. 1998) 
(conducting an intrajurisdictional comparison). While all of these courts misapplied 
Harmelin, none struck down a punishment as disproportionate. 
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tive damages verdicts violate due process. Appellate courts have 
not hesitated to utilize this discretion.174 While a number of courts 
have applied BMW and subsequently rejected what could be seen 
as plausible challenges to the constitutionality of punitive damages 
verdicts/75 at minimum, ten courts have relied on BMW to explic-
itly find punitive damages verdicts to be so excessive as to violate 
due process176 and hence to be unconstitutiona1.177 
174 But see Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, The Predictability of Punitive 
Damages Awards in Published Opinions, the Impact of BMW v. Gore on Punitive 
Damages Awards, and Forecasting Which Punitive Damages Awards Will Be Re-
duced, 7 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 59,79--83 (1999) (finding no significant difference either 
in the pattern of awards before or after BMW or in the rate at which courts ordered 
reduction of punitive damages after BMW). 
175 See, e.g., United States v. Big D Enterprises, 184 F.3d 924, 928 (8t1I Cir. 1999) 
(upholding a $100,000 punitive damages verdict for a Fair Housing Act violation re-
sulting in $1,000 in compensatory damages); Johansen v. Combustion Engineering, 
170 F.3d 1320, 1327, 1340 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding tliat a $4.35 million punitive dam-
ages verdict for a nuisance and trespass water pollution claim was not excessive even 
though compensatory damages were only $47,000); Daka, Inc. v. Breiner, 711 A.2d 
86, 88 (D.C. 1998) (upholding a $390,000 punitive damages verdict that was 39 times 
higher than compensatory damages); Walston v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 923 P.2d 
456, 458, 468 (Idaho 1996) (holding tliat a $3.2 million punitive damages verdict that 
was 26 times higher tlian the compensatory damages did not violate due process); 
Ford Motor Co. v. Ammerman, 705 N.E.2d 539, 544, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (refus-
ing to find a $13.8 million punitive damages verdict for a defectively made vehicle 
resulting in injuries to be unconstitutional); Axen v. American Home Prods. Corp. ex. 
rei. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 974 P.2d 224,228,244 (Or. Ct. App.1999) (finding that a $20 
million punitive damages verdict for a medication resulting in blindness was not un-
constitutionally excessive); Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 958 P.2d 854, 857 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1998) (refusing to find a $2 million punitive damages verdict for a false arrest 
claim resulting in $125,000 in compensatory damages to be excessive); Schaffer v. 
Edward D. Jones & Co., 552 N.W.2d 801,804,817 (S.D. 1996) (finding that a $750,000 
punitive damages verdict for a fraud claim of $25,000 in actual damages was not a vio-
lation of substantive due process). 
176 See Watkins v. Lundell, 169 F.3d 540, 547 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding a $3.5 million 
punitive damages verdict for fraudulent business practices to be unconstitutional); 
FDIC v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 854, 862 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that a $1.2 million pu-
nitive damages verdict for fraud is unconstitutional); Continental Trend Resources v. 
OXY USA, 101 F.3d 634, 642 (10th Cir. 1996) (striking down a $30 lnillion punitive 
damages verdict for tortious interference with contract as unconstitutional); Life Ins. 
Co. v. Parker, 726 So. 2d 619, 625 (Ala. 1998) (finding that a $200,000 punitive dam-
ages award for insurance fraud and misrepresentation violates due process); Ford 
Motor Co. v. Sperau, 708 So. 2d 111, 125 (Ala. 1997) (finding tliat a $6 million puni-
tive damages verdict for fraud and misrepresentation violates due process); American 
Pioneer Life Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 704 So. 2d 1361, 1367 (Ala. 1997) (holding that a 
$2 million punitive damages verdict for insurance fraud and breach of contract vio-
lates due process); Cates Constr. v. Talbot Partners, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 548, 571 (Cal. Ct. 
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The Tenth Circuit's decision in Continental Trend Resources v. 
OXY USA/18 finding a $30 million punitive damages verdict to be 
so excessive as to violate due process, provides an excellent exam-
ple of the willingness of post-BMW courts to strike down punitive 
damages awards as unconstitutional, as well as the flexibility those 
courts have to do so. OXY had intentionally and repeatedly inter-
fered with the plaintiff's business contracts and falsified documents 
m order to harm the plaintiffs; this resulted in a $30 million puni-
tive damages award.179 The OXY court applied BMW's first prong 
and assessed the reprehensibility of this conduce80 While the court 
found this conduct to be reprehensible, it concluded that the high-
est possible punitive damages award was not permissible because 
OXY's actions resulted only in economic harm.181 Turning to 
App.) (striking down a $28 million punitive damages verdict for breach of good faith 
and fair business dealing as unconstitutional); Langmead v. Admiral Cruises, 696 So. 
2d 1189, 1194 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (finding that a $3.5 million punitive damages 
verdict for failure to pay plaintiff's salary while she was injured violates substantive 
due process); Parrott v. Carr Chevrolet, 965 P.2d 440, 452 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (hold-
ing that a $1 million punitive damages verdict for fraudulently selling a vehicle 
without disclosing extensive defects is unconstitutional); Apache Corp. v. Moore, 960 
S.W.2d 746, 750 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) (striking down as unconstitutional a punitive 
damages verdict of $562,500 for negligently causing a gas well to explode). Virtually 
all of the cases finding punitive damages verdicts to be unconstitutional on excessive-
ness grounds involved economic harm; high punitive damages awards for fraud and 
misrepresentation have frequently been struck down. 
177 The conclusion that ten cases have found punith:e damages verdicts to be uncon-
stitutional is a conservative estimate. Some courts have employed BMW to find 
punitive damages verdicts to be excessive without actually stating that they were find-
ing the size of the verdict to be unconstitutional. See Inter Med. Supplies v. EBI Med. 
Sys., 181 F.3d 446, 465-67 (3d Cir. 1999) (relying on BMW to find a $100.6 million pu-
nitive damages verdict for torts flowing from breach of contract to be excessive, but 
never stating that the verdict was unconstitutional or violated due process); Denesha 
v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 161 F.3d 491, 502-05 (8th Cir. 1998) (mentioning that due proc-
ess is one consideration in punitive damages cases, but not explaining whether a due 
process violation was the reason a $4 million punitive damages verdict was found to 
be excessive); Wilson v. IBP, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 132, 145-48 (Iowa 1996) (explaining 
that punitive damages verdicts must comport with the due process standards set down 
in Haslip, TXO, and BMW, but only finding that a $15 million punitive damages 
award was "excessive"). Though some of these cases may be construed as finding pu-
nitive damages verdicts to be unconstitutional, this Note has omitted them from the 
analysis since the courts themselves never explicitly found the verdicts to be unconsti-
tutional. 
178101 F.3d 634 (lOth Cir. 1996). 
179 See id. at 638-39. 
180 See id. 
181 Seeid. 
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BMWs second factor, the Tenth Circuit panel compared the ratio 
of punitive to compensatory damages. The court concluded that 
because this was only an economic-injury case, the ratio of punitive 
to compensatory damages should not exceed ten to one, a ratio 
substantially smaller than the thirty-to-one verdict awarded by the 
jury.182 Applying BMWs third factor, comparable civil and criminal 
penalties for the defendant's misconduct, the court determined that 
OXY's misconduct amounted to a common-law tort that could not 
easily be compared to civil or criminal penalties.183 Finally, although 
BMW did not instruct it do so, the Tenth Circuit panel considered 
OXY's wealth in deciding whether the $30 million punitive dam-
ages verdict was excessive.184 The court concluded that $30 million 
was far more than necessary to punish and affect the conduct of a 
defendant of OXY's size.185 Based on all of these factors, the court 
concluded that the maximum constitutionally permissible punitive 
damages verdict was $6 million.186 The court ordered remittitur to 
that amount, instructing the plaintiffs to accept $6 million or to un-
dertake a new trial.187 
OXY speaks volumes about the discretion post-BMW courts 
have to strike down (or uphold, for that matter) punitive damages 
awards. On the one hand, the Tenth Circuit panel could have de-
termined that, while offensive, tortious interference with contract 
was not reprehensible enough to merit a sizable punitive damages 
award;188 on the other hand, the court just as easily could have up-
held the $30 million verdict because OXY's intentional and 
repeated conduct was sufficiently reprehensible.189 The court had 
equal discretion in assessing the ratio of punitive to compensatory 
damages. Purportedly reasoning from the Supreme Court's deci-
182 See id. at 639-40. 
183 See id. at 641. 
1&4 See id. at 642. 
185 See id. 
186 See id. at 643. 
187 See id. 
188 Cf. Dyer v. Bergman & Assocs., 657 A.2d 1132, 1139 n.10 (D.C. 1995) (suggesting 
that punitive damages might not be available for tortious interference with contract). 
189 The dissent, for instance, argued that OXY's conduct was sufficiently egregious 
to support a $20 million punitive damages verdict. See OXY, 101 F.3d at 644-45 
(Brown, J., dissenting); see also Central Telecommunications v. TCI Cablevision, 800 
F.2d 711, 730--31 {8th Cir. 1986) (upholding a $25 million punitive damages verdict for 
tortious interference with contract). 
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sions in Haslip and TX0,190 the OXY court concluded that the 
maximum permissible punitive to compensatory damages ratio in 
economic-injury cases was ten to orie.191 While ten to one sounds 
like a fair ratio, the court could just as easily have concluded that 
the constitutional ceiling for a punitive to compensatory damages 
ratio in economic-injury cases was four to one,192 or forty to one.193 
The OXY decision also demonstrates that lower courts have flexi-
bility to stray from the three BMW factors in assessing the 
proportionality of punitive damages. The Tenth Circuit panel es-
sentially ignored the third BMW prong194 -comparable civil and 
criminal penalties-and at the same time considered the defen-
dant's wealth,195 a factor not even present in the Supreme Court's 
BMW test. 
The OXY decision demonstrates that the supposedly "objective" 
BMW guideposts provide almost no objective constraints. The Su-
preme Court's failure to announce a maximum ratio of punitive to 
compensatory damages permits lower courts to make up any ratio 
190 See supra notes 102-16 and accompanying text. 
191 See OXY, 101 F3d at 639. 
192 See Ford Motor Co. v. Sperau, 708 So. 2d 111, 120 (Ala. 1997) (finding a $6 mil-
lion punitive damages award unconstitutionally excessive even though it was only 3.5 
times greater than the compensatory damages). 
193 See Daka, Inc. v. Breiner, 711 A.2d 86, 88 (D.C. 1998) (finding that a $390,000 
punitive damages verdict that was 39 times higher than the compensatory damages 
was not so grossly excessive as to violate due process); Walston v. Monumental Life 
Ins. Co., 923 P.2d 456, 458, 468 (Idaho 1996) (finding that a $10 million punitive dam-
ages verdict for bad faith denial of insurance benefits did not offend the Constitution 
even though it was 26 times greater than the actual damages); Williams v. Aetna Fin. 
Co., 700 N.E.2d 859, 870-71 (Ohio 1998) (finding that a $1.5 million punitive damages 
verdict for conspiracy and fraud did not violate due process even though it was .100 
times greater than the economic damages); Schaffer v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 552 
N.W.2d 801, 804 (S.D. 1996) (finding that a $750,000 punitive damages verdict for 
fraud did not offend due process even though it was 30 times greater than the com-
pensatory damages). 
194 The OXY court at least mentioned the third BMW prong before declining to util-
ize it. Other courts have neglected to even mention the third prong in their analysis. 
See, e.g., Dean v. Olibas, 129 F.3d 1001, 1003, 1008 (8th Cir. 1997) (upholding a 
$70,000 punitive damages verdict against a constitutional challenge without discussing 
comparable civil or criminal penalties). 
195 For additional examples of lower courts using the wealth factor to strike down 
punitive damages verdicts, see Watkins v. Lundell, 169 F.3d 540 (8th Cir.1999); FDIC 
v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 854 (lOth Cir. 1997); Ford Motor Co. v. Sperau, 708 So. 2d 111 
(Ala. ~997); American Pioneer Life Ins. Co. v. Willimnson, 704 So. 2d 1361 (Ala. 
1997). 
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they see fit. Additionally, the flexibility of the BMW test permits 
lower courts to ignore some guideposts-such as comparable civil 
and criminal sanctions-and create other guideposts, such as the 
defendant's wealth.196 BMW thus provided courts with overly broad 
discretion to strike down (or uphold) punitive damages awards as 
unconstitutionally excessive. 
Despite this flexibility, there is also evidence that BMW has low-
ered the constitutional ceiling, thus forcing lower courts to assess 
more rigorously the constitutionality of punitive damages verdicts. 
In OXY, the Tenth Circuit had originally upheld the $30 million 
punitive damages verdice97 However, after deciding BMW, the 
United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment in OXY so 
that it could be reconsidered in light of the BMW holding.198 Subse-
quently, the Tenth Circuit relied on BMW to reduce the previously 
acceptable $30 million punitive damages verdict to $6 million.199 In 
a similar tum of events, three other punitive damages verdicts were 
struck down as nnconstitutional after the BMW decision, even 
though the verdicts had originally been upheld.200 Thus, there is 
some evidence that BMW not only provides lower courts with the 
opportunity to strike down punitive damages awards, but also that 
it encourages them to do so. 
Three conclusions can be drawn from the BMW progeny. First, 
BMW sends a signal to lower courts that they should rigorously as-
sess the proportionality of punitive damages verdicts. Second, the 
BMW framework affords lower courts tremendous discretion to 
carry out this task. Finally, lower courts have used their discretion 
196 One court has interpreted BMW so flexibly as to allow for comparisons of puni-
tive damages verdicts handed down in other cases. See Parrot v. Carr Chevrolet, 965 
P.2d 440, 453 (Or. Ct. App. 1998). 
197 See Continental Trend Resources v. OXY USA, 44 F.3d 1465, 1480 (lOth Cir. 
1995), vacated sub nom. OXY USA v. Continental Trend Resources, 517 U.S. 1216 
(1996). 
198 See OXY USA v. Continental Trend Resources, 517 U.S. 1216, 1216-17 (1996). 
199 See Continental Trend Resources v. OXY USA, 101 F.3d 634, 643 (lOth Cir. 
1996). 
200 See Ford Motor Co. v. Sperau, 708 So. 2d 111 (Ala. 1997); American Pioneer Life 
Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 704 So. 2d 1361 (Ala. 1997); Apache Corp. v. Moore, 960 
S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997). 
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to strike down a number of punitive damages awards that other-
wise would have been upheld.201 
The Harmelin and BMW progeny confirm that more rigorous 
proportionality review is afforded to punitive damages verdicts 
than to criminal punishments. Except for two cases that misinter-
preted Harmelin, lower courts have rejected all proportionality 
challenges to criminal punishments, often after only cursory analy-
sis. Those same courts have rigorously assessed the proportionality 
of punitive damages awards and have not hesitated to find verdicts 
unconstitutionally excessive. 
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF EXCESSIVE CRIMINAL PUNISHMENTS AND 
EXCESSIVE PUNITIVE DAMAGES VERDICTS: WHICH AREA 
SHOULD BE AFFORDED GREATER PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW? 
It is clear that the Supreme Court has endorsed more rigorous 
proportionality review of punitive damages verdicts than of crimi-
nal punishments. Putting aside arguments that courts should not 
conduct proportionality review in either context,202 the key question 
is whether punitive damages verdicts should be entitled to more 
rigorous proportionality review. Put another way, the question is 
whether punitive damages verdicts and excessive punishments 
should be given the same degree of judicial review, or whether one 
area is entitled to more stringent review than the other. 
201 BMW has been so far-reaching that it has had impact outside the constitutional 
domain; courts have relied on the BMW framework to strike down excessive punitive 
damages on nonconstitutional grounds. Set'?, e.g., Patterson v. P.H.P. Healthcare 
Corp., 90 F.3d 927, 943 (5th Cir. 1996) ("We understand that BMW deals with consti-
tutional limits on punitive damages, but we find it instructive [in a statutory challenge 
to excessive punitive damages].") (emphasis added). 
202 See, e.g., Mackey, supra note 21, at 635-45 (reviewing arguments against federal 
courts' involvement in proportionality review of criminal punishments). Opponents of 
appellate proportionality review maintain that legislatures are better equipped than 
courts to make such decisions, and that principles of federalism entitle legislatures to 
promulgate their own laws even in the face of less punitive laws of other states. See 
Kevin L. Hicks, Note, Worse Than TXO: Substantive Due Reasonableness in BMW 
of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 20 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 310, 320 (1996) ("Imposi-
tion of constitutional 'reasonableness' standards through substantive review of 
punitive awards is quite simply an infringement of the States' power to make and en-
force their own laws."). 
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A. The (Incorrect) Argument That Punitive Damages Awards 
Should Be Afforded More Rigorous Proportionality Review 
At first glance, it makes sense for the Court to afford more 
strenuous judicial review to punitive damages verdicts. Punitive 
damages awards are handed down by juries, usually composed of 
twelve randomly selected persons who typically have no expertise 
in the law or the subject matter of the case. As such, these jurors 
may not have the ability to mete out a proper penalty, and excessive 
verdicts may result.203 Conversely, criminal sentences are prescribed 
by statutes that were drafted by sovereign and (hopefully) compe-
tent legislatures. Unlike punitive damages verdicts, which are 
assigned by juries without reference to the size of other punitive 
damages awards, legislatures carefully determine criminal penalties 
in the context of other offenses so as to create a graduated system 
of punishments.204 The argument, therefore, is that the Supreme 
Court should be more inclined to allow carefully determined legis-
lative criminal punishments to stand while affording greater 
judicial review to randomly assessed punitive damages verdicts. 
This logic, however, is flawed. 
Quite simply, juries do not have the final say on the size of puni-
tive damages awards. Nearly all jury verdicts are subject to review 
by the trial judge.205 If the judge believes the verdict is excessive, 
she may order remittitur. Remittitur is a reduction of the jury's ex-
203 See Paul Magin, Why Judges, Not Juries, Should Set Punitive Damages, 65 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 179, 207-15 (1998) (arguing that juries are not in a good position to set 
punitive damages because they are susceptible to emotional factors, are unduly influ-
enced by a defendant's wealth, and are often unfamiliar with the sanctions imposed 
for similar misconduct); see also Ellis, supra note 93, at 37-39 (lamenting jury discre-
tion in punitive damages cases because juries ltave no independent knowledge of the 
legal standards, and the instructions jurors are given are vague and unilluminating); 
Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Punitive Damages, Due Process, and the Jury, 40 Ala. L. Rev. 
975, 1003-{)7 (1989) (recommending that judges determine punitive damages). 
204 In addition to the well-known federal sentencing guidelines, a number of states 
have also enacted rigid sentencing guidelines that carefully determine the punishment 
for a given offense. See Michael Tonry, Sentencing Matters 25-31 (1996). Moreover, 
while many states still entrust judges and juries with wide discretion to make sentenc-
ing decisions, even these states constrain sentencing discretion by providing a range of 
minimum and maximum punishments. 
205 See Irene Deaville Sann, Remittiturs (And Additurs) in the Federal Courts: An 
Evaluation with Suggested Alternatives, 38 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 157, 165-67 (1987) 
(explainiug that remittitur has been utilized in every federal circuit and most state 
courts). 
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cessive verdict to an amount of damages that reasonably could 
have been assessed against the defendant; the plaintiff then has the 
option of accepting this reduced award or undergoing a new trial.206 
Trial judges frequently order remittitur of large punitive damages 
verdicts207 without a finding that the verdict is unconstitutionally 
excessive.208 Moreover, if a trial court decides not to order remitti-
tur, the defendant may appeal the verdict,209 contending that the 
trial court abused its discretion by failing to reduce the award.210 
The appellate court then has authority to order remittitur of the 
punitive damages verdict.211 
Given that judges can, and frequently do, order remittitur of pu-
nitive damages verdicts and that defendants can appeal trial courts' 
21!6 See id. at 160-63. 
2111 See, e.g., Food Lion v. Capital Cities/ABC, 984 F. Supp. 923 (M.D.N.C.1997) (or-
dering remittitur of a $5.5 million punitive damages verdict to $315,000); Geuss v. 
Pfizer, Inc., 971 F. Supp. 164 (E.D. Pa.1996) (remitting a $150,000 punitive damages 
verdict to $17,500); Iannone v. Frederic R. Harris, Inc., 941 F. Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996) (ordering remittitur of a $250,000 punitive damages award to $50,000). 
203 Remittitur is a tricky subject, as it appears to conflict with the Seventh Amend-
ment. The Seventh Amendment, which is only binding against the federal 
government, see Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92-93 (1876), provides in relevant 
part that "no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the 
United States, than according to the rules of the common law." U.S. Const. amend. 
VII. Despite this language, the Supreme Court has held that trial judges may reduce a 
jury's award of excessive damages to a permissible level. The logic is that if a trial 
judge could order a new trial because the damages were excessive, then the judge 
surely has the power to reduce the damages to a permissible level while still awarding 
the plaintiff the option of a new trial. See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486-87 
(1934). For a history and analysis of remittitur, see Lopez, supra note 5, at 1326-42. 
'1m The Supreme Court recently held that this practice, referred to as appellate re-
mittitur, does not violate the Seventh Amendment. See Gasperini v. Center for 
Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 436 (1996). 
210 Under the Erie doctrine, see Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the 
"abuse of discretion" standard applies only to claims based on federal law. When a 
claim is based on state law-even if the case is brought pursuant to diversity jurisdic-
tion in federal court-the court must look to state law to determine whether 
remittitur is recognized, and, if so, what standard applies. See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 
436-39. 
211 See, e.g., Hillcrest Center v. Rone, 711 So. 2d 901 (Ala.1997) (ordering remittitur 
of a $130,000 punitive damages verdict to $94,000); Union Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Crocker, 709 So. 2d 1118 (Ala. 1997) (ordering remittitur of a $2 million punitive 
damages verdict to $1 million); Notrica v. State Compensation Ins. Fnnd, 83 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 89 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)·(ordering remittitur of a $20 million punitive dam-
ages verdict to $5 million). Frequently, however, the appellate court will remand the 
case to a lower court to determine the proper remittitur. See, e.g., Smith v. Lightning 
Bolt Productions, 861 F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1988). 
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decisions not to grant remittitur, it is not accurate to assert that ju-
ries impose punitive damages with free rein. Since hefty punitive 
damages verdicts are not the work of rogue or incompetent juries, 
but rather are judgments approved by trial and appellate courts as 
reasonable, there seems littie·reason for punitive damages verdicts 
to be entitled to less constitutional deference than criminal pun-
ishments. To the contrary, two arguments suggest that courts 
should conduct more rigorous proportionality review of criminal 
punishments than of punitive damages verdicts. 
B. A Brief Argument That Deprivations of Liberty Are More 
Serious and in Greater Need of Judicial Review Than 
Deprivations of Property 
The Declaration of Independence articulated the rights to "life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."212 The Constitution-in the 
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments-
reiterated the importance of these concepts, this time by speaking 
of life, liberty, and property.213 While life, liberty, and property are 
all important values, it is important to consider whether one value 
is more important than another. If liberty is more important than 
property, then excessive criminal punishment cases (which amount 
to deprivations of liberty) should be entitled to more rigorous pro-
portionality review than excessive punitive damages verdicts 
(which are deprivations of property). While a textual argument can 
be made that life, liberty, and property are hierarchical rights of 
descending importance, ultimately it is the Supreme Court's capital 
punishment and criminal procedure jurisprudence which suggests 
that deprivations of liberty are more important than deprivations 
of property. 
The textual argument that liberty is more important than prop-
erty is fairly simple (and perhaps, as a result, not very convincing). 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states, 
"Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law."214 Notably, "life" is listed first, "lib-
erty" second, and "property" third. If the Framers had intended 
212 The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
213 See U.S. Const. amend. V; U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
214 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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property to be more important than liberty, they would have listed 
property before liberty in the text of the amendment. The text 
therefore seems to indicate, at minimum, that property was not 
considered to be more important than liberty. That, of course, does 
not mean that the text proves that the Framers thought that prop-
erty was less important than liberty. The Framers could have 
intended for deprivations of life, liberty, and property to be con-
sidered equally importaut, in which case the order of the words 
"life, liberty, and property" would have been merely coincidental 
and hence meaningless. Thus, while the language of the amend-
ments seems to indicate that property is not more important than 
liberty, the text does not prove that the Framers thought that 
property was any less important thau liberty. The Court's capital 
punishment and criminal procedure jurisprudence is more telling, 
however. 
Over the last twenty-five years, the Supreme Court has operated 
under the proposition that "death is different."215 Since capital pun-
ishment, in its finality, is different from every other type of 
punishment, the Court has required increased procedural safeguards 
in capital cases.216 Additionally, the Court has instituted substantive 
restrictions on the use of capital punishment. For instance, the Court 
has forbidden the imposition of the death penalty on minors under 
the age of sixteen217 as well as for those convicted of rape (of an 
adult woman).218 Similar procedural safeguards and substantive re-
strictions do not apply to criminal defendants who merely face the 
possibility of prison sentences. The Court's basis for the height-
ened requirements in capital cases is that a death sentence is a 
more serious punishment than a prison sentence. Put more techni-
cally, the Court has concluded that the deprivation of life is more 
serious than the deprivation of liberty. 
215 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976). 
216 See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) ("Given that the imposition of 
death by public authority is so profoundly different from all other penalties, we can-
not avoid the conclusion that an individualized decision is essential in capital cases. 
The need for treating each defendant in a capital case with that degree of respect due 
the uniqueness of the individual is far more important than in noncapital cases."). 
217 See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,838 (1988). 
218 See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 595-99 (1977). 
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The Supreme Court's conclusion that life is more important than 
liberty suggests that a hierarchy of rights does exist. As such, if life 
is more important than liberty, it is plausible to suggest that liberty 
in tum might be more important than property. The Court's non-
capital criminal procedure jurisprudence supports and completes 
this argument. Drawing on the Bill of Rights, the Court has created 
a code of criminal procedure219 that affords unique procedural pro-
tections to criminal defendants.220 For instance, the Court has 
incorporated the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in criminal 
cases to be binding against the states,221 but has declined to do the 
same for the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in civil 
cases.222 Consider also the differing standards of proof required in 
criminal and civil cases. The Court has mandated that a criminal 
defendant can be convicted only upon proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt;223 conversely, a civil defendant will be found liable if the 
plaintiff meets the less stringent preponderance-of-the-evidence 
standard.224 The existence of these heightened procedural safe-
guards in criminal cases lends credence to the idea that there is a 
hierarchy of rights and that deprivations of liberty are more impor-
tant than deprivations of property. 
This conclusion makes intuitive sense. In most cases, deprivation 
of liberty is more stigmatizing than the deprivation of property; be-
ing sent to prison is viewed as more shameful than being ordered 
to pay a fine.225 In addition to shame, the incarcerated offender 
usually suffers more than the fined offender. Although a defendant 
219 See Hem:y J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 
Cal. L Rev. 929 (1965); see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Constitution and Criminal 
Procedure: First Principles 146-47 (1997) (explaining that the Warren Court created 
"a remarkable doctrinal edifice of ... constitutional criminal procedure"). 
220 Interestingly, as noted above, increased procedural safeguards in capital cases 
separate death-penalty cases from ordinary criminal cases and help to support the ar-
gument that deprivations of life are more important than deprivations of liberty. In 
tum, the fact that ordinary criminal cases involve greater procedural safeguards than 
civil cases supports the argument that deprivations of liberty are more important than 
deprivations of property. 
221 See D~mcan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157-58 (1968). 
222 See Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92-93 (1876). 
223 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
224 See James Brook, Inevitable Errors, The Preponderance of the Evidence Stan-
dard in Civil Litigation, 18 Tulsa LJ. 79,79-80 (1982). 
225 See Hugo Adam Bedau, Death is Different: Studies in the Morality, Law, and 
Politics of Capital Punishment 26 {1987). 
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may struggle to pay a civil sanction, in most cases the fined of-
fender pays the fine and moves on. The incarcerated offender, 
however, must continue to live in an environment of restricted lib-
erty, physical danger, and general discomfort until his sentence is 
over.226 Thus, to put it simply, being deprived of liberty is worse 
than being deprived ofproperty.227 
Having established a plausible argument that liberty is more im-
portant than property, it follows that courts should afford more 
rigorous proportionality review to criminal punishments than to 
punitive damages awards. In other words, if it is more serious to 
imprison someone than to fine him, then courts should expend 
more resources to prevent disproportionate criminal sentences and 
be less concerned about disproportionate punitive damages 
awards. 
C. The Political Process Theory Argument for Proportionality 
Review of Excessive Criminal Punishments but Not 
Excessive Punitive Damages Awards 
While it makes sense to argue that liberty is more important 
than property (and hence that criminal punishments should be 
more rigorously reviewed than punitive damages awards), the best 
argument for heightened proportionality review of criminal pun-
ishments comes from political process theory. The political process 
idea, first articulated.by Justice Harlan Fiske Stone in tQ.e famous 
footnote four of United States v. Carotene Products Co.,m was 
crafted into a prominent theory of judicial review by John Hart Ely 
in his seminal work, Democracy and Distrust. 229 • The Carotene 
Products footnote suggested that the Court would be deferential to 
economic legislation but would carefully scrutinize individual lib-
erty cases where a failure in the political process had prevented a 
group's voice from being heard or where a law prejudiced a dis-
226 See Stuntz, supra note 21, at 24-25 (explaining that incarceration is a worse pun-
ishment than damages and that the former should be reserved for worse offenders). 
m Of course, counter-examples can be imagined. For instance, a fine exceeding 
one's assets is probably worse than one hour of incarceration. Nevertheless, in the 
majority of cases it is certainly plausible to suggest that deprivations of liberty are 
more invasive than deprivations of property. 
228 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). 
229 John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (1980). 
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crete or insular minority. Ely developed this brief footnote into 
what he termed a "representation-reinforcing"230 theory of judicial 
review.231 
Ely's political process model calls for judges to stay out of the 
substantive decisionmaking business (an area our democratic sys-
tem leaves to legislatures) aud instead to concentrate on what 
judges are most qualified to do: ensure proper process.232 In oppos-
ing substantive policy judgments by the judiciary, Ely posited that 
courts should strike down laws under only three circumstances. 
First, a law is constitutionally infirm when it unequivocally conflicts 
with the text of the Constitution.233 The unambiguous constitutional 
provision requiring that the President be thirty-five years of age 
falls within this category; the vague Eighth Amendment protection 
against cruel and unusual punishment does not.234 Second, courts 
should intervene when access to the political process has been cut 
off. When "out groups" are cut off from the political process and 
are subsequently disadvantaged by "in groups" that control the po-
litical process, it is the judiciary's job to intervene by clearing the 
channels of political participation.235 Put another way, it is the judi-
ciary's job to prevent the majority from suppressing the political 
voice of the minority. Third and finally, courts should strike down 
laws designed to prejudice discrete or insular minority groups, even 
if the minority group had full access to the political process.236 The 
prejudice prong calls on courts to protect those groups whose 
needs and wishes legislatures have no interest in protecting.237 AI-
230 Ely, supra note 229, at 88. 
231 Although his theory is largely based on the Carolene Products footnote, Ely 
makes a case for political process theory based on the provisions of the Constitution 
as well as American democratic history. See Raoul Berger, Ely's "Theory of Judicial 
Review," 42 Ohio St. L.J. 87, 87 (1981) ("(W]here Justice Stone spun his footnote out 
of thin air, Ely would root it in the Constitution."). For instance, Ely argues that the 
Constitution is an inherently procedural document concerned with reinforcing de-
mocratic values and access to the political process. He explains that five of the eleven 
(now twelve) twentieth-century amendments to the Constitution were concerned with 
the franchise. See Ely, supra note 229, at 99. 
232 See Ely, supra note 229, at 88. 
233 See id. at 75-76. 
234 See id. at 13. 
235 See id. at 102-03. 
236 See id. 
237 See id. at 151. 
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though Ely's theory has given rise to prolific and substantial criti-
cism,238 it is nevertheless considered one of the most important 
contributions to the theory of judicial review in the last century.239 
1. How the Political Process Succeeds in Protecting Defendants 
from Excessive Punitive Damages Awards 
As will become readily apparent, the Court's proportionality ju-
risprudence does not conform to political process theory. Let us 
begin with proportionality review of punitive damages. First, we 
must ask if disproportionate punitive damages awards contravene a 
direct and unambiguous constitutional provision. While the Su-
preme Court found in BMW v. Gore that excessive punitive 
damages awards could be so unreasonable as to violate due proc-
ess, substantive due process hardly constitutes a direct and 
unambiguous constitutional provision.240 In fact, the idea that 
courts should be able to reach out to the meta-text to discover a 
238 See, e.g., Berger, supra note 231, at 88-89 (questioning the historical accuracy of 
Ely's arguments and assumptions); Michael J. Klarman, Puzzling Resistance to Politi-
cal Process Theory, 77 Va. L. Rev. 747, 782-88 (1991) (arguing that while the 
"process" part of Ely's theory survives, the "prejudice" aspect of the theory fails be-
cause there cannot be a nonsubstantive theory of prejudice); Laurence H. Tribe, The 
Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 Yale L.J. 1063, 
1064, 1072-77, (1980) (arguing that process-based models fail because at some point 
proper process must be guided by substantive decisions, such as which groups are dis-
crete and insular minorities); Mark Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The 
Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 Yale L.J. 1037, 1051-53 
(1980) (positing that it is often difficult to define who is the "out-group" or the "they" 
in "we/they" process theories). Critics have been largely successful in attacking the 
prejudice prong of Ely's theory because, even promulgated as a representation-
reinforcing idea, it forces the judiciary to make the same type of substantive judg-
ments that Ely opposes. The process component of Ely's theory, however, has 
weathered the academic storm. See Klarman, supra, at 748 ("My bottom line is that 
the access, but not the prejudice, prong of political process theory has emerged rela-
tively unscathed from the barbs of Ely's critics."). 
239 See, e.g., Daniel R. Ortiz, Pursuing a Perfect Politics: The Allure and Failure of 
Process Theory, 77 Va. L. Rev. 721, 721 (1991) ("Few, if any, books have had the im-
pact on constitutional theory of John Hart Ely's Democracy and Distrust."). 
w A more plausible argument could be made that excessive punitive damages 
awards violate the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme 
Court, however, has rejected such a challenge. See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco 
Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 263-64 (1989) ("Whatever the outer confines of the [Excessive 
Fines] Clause's reach may be, we now decide only that it does not constrain an award 
of money damages in a civil suit when the government neither has prosecuted the ac-
tion nor has any right to receive a share of the damages awarded."). 
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fundamental protection ag~st unreasonable punitive damages is 
anathema to the entire premise of political process theory; it 
amounts to unelected judges making substantive decisions that 
should be made by legislators. 
Second, political process theory instructs us to consider whether 
there has been a failure in the political process whereby an "out 
group" has been cut off from the process and adversely affected by 
a law (or, in this case, a lack thereof). To qualify as an "out group," 
victims of excessive punitive damages would have to contend first 
that they did not have access to the political process, and second 
that if they had had access they might have been able to pass laws 
limiting or eliminating punitive damages awards. This "process" 
challenge to punitive damages undoubtedly fails. Simply put, those 
claiming that punitive damages awards are unconstitutionally ex-
cessive do not constitute an "out group." Victims of excessive 
punitive damages awards cases are typically large companies with 
unimpeded access to the political process. As such, they had access 
to the political process, and the absence of laws limiting punitive 
damages is not the result of a failure in the political process, but 
rather a conscious choice on the part of legislatures not to restrict 
the size of punitive damages awards. 
Finally, defendants facing large punitive damages verdicts would 
also be unsuccessful in contending that they constitute a discrete qr 
insular minority whose interests have been ignored by the political 
process. Defendants likely to be subject to excessive punitive dam-
ages verdicts are often large corporations with substantial capital. 
In terms of success in the political process, "money talks," and it is 
nearly untenable to suggest that large corporations with substantial 
economic resources would be unable to find sympathetic allies in 
the legislatures.241 Additionally, even if legislators were unsympa-
thetic to the prospect of corporate contributions, victims of 
excessive punitive damages verdicts could still find overwhelming 
support in the general population. In the face of extremely large 
punitive damages awards-such as the infamous $2.9 million puni-
tive damages award for burns resulting from McDonald's 
241 To the contrary, the charge is usually that substantial economic resources give 
groups too much access to the political process. See, e.g., Charles Lewis, The Buying 
of the Congress: How Special Interests Have Stolen Your Right to Life, Liberty and 
the Pursuit of Happiness (1998). 
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coffee242 -the general public often perceives a tort crisis in which 
punitive damages are out of control.243 
The ability to gain the support of legislators through campaign 
contributions, coupled with the support of the majority of the pub-
lic, makes it inconceivable that victims of excessive punitive 
damages constitute a discrete or insular minority group likely to be 
prejudiced by the legislative process. 
A cursory glance at punitive damages laws enacted across the 
country in recent years demonstrates that those opposed to exces-
sive punitive damages are anything but a discrete or insular 
minority group .ignored by the political process. Not only have op-
ponents of excessive punitive damages had access to the political 
process, they have also had overwhelming success. No fewer than 
sixteen states have enacted caps on punitive damages to protect de-
fendants from excessive awards in all causes of action.244 For 
instance, Virginia limits punitive damages awards to $350,000.245 
New Hampshire has gone even further by prohibiting punitive 
damages in virtually all cases.246 Other states have capped punitive 
damages awards for specific types of claims, such as medical mal-
242 See Jurors Sting McDonalds for Scalding Coffee, Chi. Trib., Aug. 19, 1994, at 6, 
available in LEXIS, Chicago Tribune File. Although it is not surprising that a $2.9 
million award for hot coffee outraged the public, there are factors that make the ver-
dict seem more reasonable. See Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary 
Legends About the Civil Justice System, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 717,731-32 (1998) (explain-
ing that the plaintiff suffered third-degree bums, that the coffee was 20 degrees hotter 
than the industry standard, and that the defendant originally refused to pay the plain-
tiff's medical expenses). 
243 See Gregory Nathan Hoole, Note, In the Wake of Seemingly Exorbitant Punitive 
Damages Awards America Demands Caps on Punitive Damages-Are We Barking 
Up the Wrong Tree?, 22 J. Contemp. L. 459,461-62 (1996) (describing the hostile re-
action to the punitive damages awards in BMW v. Gore and the McDonald's coffee 
case). 
244 See Ala. Code § 6-11-21 (1999); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-102(1) (1999); Conn. 
Gen. Stat. § 52-240b (1999); Fla. Stat. Ann. ch. § 768.73(1) (West 1999); Ga. Code 
Ann.§ 51-12-5.1 (1999); 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 512-1115.05 (West 1999); Ind. Code Ann. 
§ 34-51-3-4 (Michie 1999); Kan. Stat. Ann.§ 60-3701(e) (1999); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 42.005(1) (Michie 2000); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A: 15-5.14 (West 1999); N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § lD-25 (1999); N.D. Cent. Code § 32-03.2-11(4) (2000); Ohio Rev. Code 
Ann. § 2315.21(D)(1)(a) (West 1999); Okla. Stat. tit. 23, §§ 9.1(B)-(D) (1999); 
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.§ 41.008 (West 2000); Va. Code Ann.§ 8.01-38.1 
(Michie 1999). 
245 See Va. Code Ann.§ 8.01-38.1 (Michie 1999). 
246 See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 507:16 (1999). 
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practice claims.247 Perhaps most n~tably, even Alabama, a state leg-
endary for its exorbitant punitive damages verdicts248 (including the 
$4 million award in BMW v. Gore), recently passed legislation cap-
ping all punitive damages awards.249 These statutes capping punitive 
damages-particularly in Alabama, arguably the most pro-plaintiff 
state in the nation-demonstrate that legislatures are able and will-
ing to deal with the problem of excessive punitive damages awards. 
In some cases, courts applying the BMW framework have run 
head-on into these recently enacted punitive damages caps. A 
Texas case provides a useful example. In Apache Corp. v. Moore/50 
a gas well exploded causing property damage.251 A jury awarded 
each of the three plaintiffs $562,500 in punitive damages, despite 
finding ouly a few thousand dollars in actual damages.252 A Texas 
appellate court originally upheld the verdict. However, the United 
States Supreme Court vacated it in light of BMW v. Gore,253 and on 
remand the Texas appellate court reduced the award.254 What is 
particularly notable is that in between the two appellate court deci-
sions, the Texas legislature passed a law limiting the amount of 
punitive damages that can be awarded in negligence cases like 
Moore.255 The enactment of this punitive damages restriction dem-
247 See 40 Pa. Cons. Stat § 1301.812-A(g) (1999). Another common restriction is the 
prohibition of punitive damages in tort actions against government entities. See, e.g., 
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 507-B: 4 (1999) (prohibiting the award of punitive damages 
against a goverrunental entity for personal injury or property damage). 
248 See David Firestone, Alabama Acts to Limit Huge Awards by Juries, N.Y. 
Times, June 2, 1999, at A16. 
249 See Ala. Code§ 6-11-21 (1999). The Alabama law, enacted in June of 1999, caps 
punitive damages at the greater of $500,000 or three times the compensatory damages 
in economic-injury cases and at the greater of $1.5 million or three times the compen-
satory damages in physical injury cases. When the defendant is a small business in an 
economic injury case, the punitive damages are capped at the greater of $50,000 or 
10% of the business' net worth. See id. 
250 891 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Ct. App.1994), vacated, 517 U.S. 1217 (1996). 
25t See id. at 674. 
252 See id. at 678. In addition to the three plaintiffs at issue in this appeal, five other 
plaintiffs were each awarded $562,500 in punitive damages, amounting to a total puni-
tive damages award of $4,500,000. 
253 SeeApache Corp. v. Moore, 517 U.S.1217 (1996). 
254 See Apache Corp. v. Moore, 960 S.W.2d 746, 750 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997). The Texas 
appellate court reduced the punitive award to $10,820 for two of the plaintiffs and to 
$21,700 for the third plaintiff. See id. 
255 See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem Code Ann.§ 41.008 (West 2000) (limiting exemplary 
damages to either $200,000, or twice the amount of economic damages plus up to 
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onstrates that the legislature was not only aware of the excessive 
punitive damages problem, but was willing to fix it. In short, the 
political process worked, and there was no need for the judiciary to 
intervene.256 
The evidence demonstrates that the political process can handle 
the problems of excessive punitive damages without help from the 
judiciary. Victims of potentially excessive punitive damages awards 
have the resources to lobby politicians and affect the political 
process. Moreover, the general public supports the movement to 
cap punitive damages awards. As such, it is not surprising that leg-
islation designed to prevent excessive punitive damages awards has 
been successful in a sizable number of states. As we shall see, 
criminal defendants cannot expect such favorable treatment from 
the political process. 
2. How the Political Process Fails to Protect Defendants from 
Excessive Criminal Punishments 
Political process theory demonstrates the need for rigorous judi-
cial review of potentially disproportionate criminal punishments. 
Arguments can be made that disproportionate punishments con-
travene a direct constitutional provision, and that criminal 
defendants lack access to the political process that metes out their 
disproportionate punishments. An even more persuasive argument 
can be made that criminal defendants constitute a discrete and in-
su1ar minority group in need of the judiciary's protection. This 
Note shall take each argument in turn. 
Political process theory first questions whether disproportionate 
criminal punishments directly contravene a provision of the Consti-
tution. Arguably, the Framers intended the Eighth Amendment's 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause to protect against dispro-
portionate punishments. While "this argnment is certainly more 
$750,000 in noneconomic damages, whichever is greater). Under the new statute-
which was not retroactive-the maximum punitive damages verdict for each of the 
plaintiffs in Moore would have been twice the amount of their economic damages 
(since there were no noneconomic damages); two of the plaintiffs could have received 
a maximum of $5,410 in punitive damages and the third plaintiff could have received a 
maximum of $10,820 in punitive damages. 
256 lt is important, however, to point out that the Texas statute was not retroactive 
and, without BMW, the excessive Moore verdict would have been upheld. The more 
important point remains that the political process functioned properly. 
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plausible than the idea that the Framers intended that the Due 
Process Clanse of the Fourteenth Amendment provide substantive 
protection against unreasonable punitive damages verdicts, it is not 
clear that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause was intended 
to proscribe disproportionate punishments.257 While it is plausible 
to argue that the Eighth Amendment should protect defendants 
against disproportionate punishments,258 an equally plausible argu-
ment suggests that the phrase "cruel and unusual punishment" 
proscribes only modes of punishment, not severity.259 With no clear 
textual answer, it is impossible to conclude that strenuous judicial 
review of disproportionate punishments is warranted. Thus, we 
should next tum to see if criminal defendants have clear access to 
the political process. 
A credible argument can be made that victims of disproportion-
ate punishments do not have unfettered access to the political 
process. Because many convicted felons cannot vote, they lack ac-
cess to the political process that is creating disproportionate 
punishments. Specifically, disenfranchised felons are unable to ac-
cess the political process to oppose recidivist ("three strikes and 
you're out"260) statutes that lead to disproportionate punishments. 
For instance, imagine a defendant who committed two felonies and 
was incarcerated. After being released from prison, he was stripped 
of his right to vote and could not vote against candidates who sup-. 
ported a new "three strikes" bill that made the commission of a 
third felony punishable by a sentence of life imprisonment. Subse-
257 See Ely, supra note 229, at 97 ("It is possible that part of the point [of the Eighth 
Amendment] was to ban punishments that were unusually severe in relation to the 
crimes for which they were being imposed."). 
258 See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1009-10 (1991) (White, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that it is unreasonable to believe that the· Eighth Amendment was 
intended to protect against excessive fines and excessive bail, but not excessive prison 
sentences). 
259 Justice Scalia advanced this position in his Harmelin opinion. Justice Scalia based 
his conclusion on historical analysis dating back to the English Declaration of Rights 
of 1689. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 966-85 (Opinion of Scalia, J.); see also Anthony F. 
Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 
Cal. L. Rev. 839 (1969) (explaining that the American colonists misinterpreted Eng-
lish history to create a doctrine whereby the prohibition against "cruel and unusual" 
punishment proscribes tortuous but not excessive punishments). 
:uo For a list of states that disenfranchise ex-felons, see Alice E. Harvey, Comment, 
Ex-Felon Disenfranchisment and Its Influence on the Black Vote: The Need for a 
Second Look, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1145, 1146 n.6 (1994). 
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quently, when the defendant committed a third felony he was sen-
tenced to life imprisonment under this recidivist statute. Arguably, 
the defendant's life sentence represents a process failure that mer-
its the judiciary's involvement. 
This argument, however, does not provide a particularly strong 
justification for judicial review of all criminal punishments. Many 
victims of disproportionate punishments are not recidivists, and as 
such had the right to vote up until their conviction.261 Since their 
punishments are not the result of process failures, an "out group" 
challenge to disproportionate punishments is not particularly con-
vincing. 
Nevertheless, an extremely simple and convincing political proc-
ess theory argument can be made that courts should engage in 
rigorous proportionality review of potentially disproportionate 
criminal punishments. Under the third prong of Professor Ely's 
representation-reinforcing theory, criminal defendants constitute a 
discrete and insular minority group that will be prejudiced by the 
legislative process.262 
In defining a discrete and insular minority, Ely explained, "The 
whole point of the approach is to identify those groups in society to 
whose needs and wishes elected officials have no apparent interest 
in attending."263 It is hard to imagine a group more fitting of this 
description than criminal defendants.264 While some criminals can 
261 See, e.g., Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1021 (White, J., dissenting). The crime that re-
sulted in Harmelin being sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole (possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine) was Harmelin's first offense. 
262 In making this argument, this Note is mindful that the "prejudice" prong of Ely's 
political process theory has been roundly criticized by commentators. See supra note 
238. This Note will make no attempt to defend the theoretical underpirmings of the 
"prejudice" prong. Relying on Ely's original theory, this Note simply offers an argu-
ment that the victims of disproportionate punishments constitute a discrete and 
insular minority group that will be prejudiced by the legislative process. 
263 Ely, supra note 229, at 151. 
264 See Stuntz, supra note 21, at 20 ("A lot of constitutional theory has been shaped 
by the idea ... that constitutional law should aim to protect groups that find it hard or 
impossible to protect themselves through the political process. If ever such a world 
existed, the universe of criminal suspects is it."); Jelffiifer Buehler, Note, Hudson v. 
McMillian: Rejecting the Serious Injury Requirement But Embracing the Malicious-
and-Sadistic Standard, 42 Cath. U. L. Rev. 683, 715 (1993) ("Prisoners, by virtue of 
their inability to vote and their physical isolation from the rest of society, represent 
the quintessential 'discrete and insular minority' whose claims, under the Eighth 
Amendment, should be heard and addressed by the courts."). 
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vote, and while citizens can lobby the legislatures for reasonable 
prison sentences, the reality is that legislatures often do not con-
sider the interests of criminal defendants. In a "tough on crime" 
political world, politicians do not win elections unless they an-
nounce that they will punish criminals severely.265 Subsequently, 
elected officials know that they will not win re-election-
something virtually every politician is interested in-unless they 
maintain their "tough on crime" image by passing strict penalties 
for criminal behavior. The need to be "tough on crime" does not 
end there, however. Frequently, incumbents who have drafted 
what could be considered proportionate prison sentences are nev-
ertheless accused of being soft on crime by their opponents. As 
such, the ever-escalating "tough on crime" rhetoric leads incum-
bents to pass even more severe sentences in order to avoid charges 
from potential challengers that they are soft on crime.266 Since it is 
almost unthinkable that a candidate could be accused of being too 
hard on crime, there is little incentive for elected officials to stop 
increasing penalties once they have reached a proportionate pun-
ishment for a particular offense.267 To a great extent, therefore, 
Interestingly, Justice O'Connor has recognized the possibility of prejudice against 
defendants, but only civil defendants. Objecting to the amount of discretion juries 
have to award punitive damages, Justice O'Connor observed, "Juries are permitted to 
target unpopular defendants, penalize unorthodox or controversial views and redis-
tribute wealth." Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 43 (1991) 
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Unfortunately, while Justice O'Connor recognized the 
problem of prejudice against punitive damages defendants, she did not point out-
either in Helm or Harmelin-that excessive criminal punishments can also be the re-
sult of prejudice against nnpopular defendants. 
265 For instance, in the 1998 New York Senate election, the candidates competed for 
votes by claiming to be tough on crime. Democratic challenger Chuck Schumer 
boasted that "Al D'Amato is not close to being as tough on crime as Chuck 
Schumer," while Senator D' Amato, a Republican, responded, "It was Chuck Schumer 
who ... voted against tougher penalties for dangerous criminals." Dao, supra note 19, 
atBl. 
71>6 One scholar contends that the war on crime and drugs has not been a response to 
public concerns about crime. See Katherine Beckett, Making Crime Pay: Law and 
Order in Contemporary American Politics (1997). To the contrary, Beckett argues 
that politicians' "tough on crime" rhetoric itself generated the public's concern about 
crime. 
267 See Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pa-
thologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act, 47 Duke LJ. 1, 1 (1997) ("No politician in recent memory has 
lost an election for being too tough on crime."); see also Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 
315 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (castigating the Court for conducting propor-
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penalties will remain severe and, at times, disproportionate. As a 
result, unless there were to be a public backlash against these dis-
proportionate sentences, something not on the horizon, criminal 
defendants can expect little consideration from the legislatures.268 
Thus, even if we eschew the argument that the Eighth Amend-
ment was not intended to protect against disproportionately severe 
criminal punishments, political process theory still provides a com-
pelling reason for courts to scrutinize criminal punishments. 
Elected officials have no interest in ensuring proportionate prison 
sentences. To the contrary, legislators actually benefit from impos-
ing disproportionate sentences because it euhances their image as 
being "tough on crime." Since criminal defendants are a discrete 
and insular minority that will be prejudiced by the political process, 
the courts must protect criminal defendants from disproportionate 
punishments. 269 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court's proportionality jurisprudence in the areas 
of criminal punishments and punitive damages is backwards. The 
tionality review of criminal sentences because "Congress has pondered for decades 
the concept of appellate review of sentences and has hesitated to act"). 
263 The argument that criminals are a discrete and insular minority that will not be 
protected by the political process is not new. Professor Ely recognized this when he 
stated, "[I]f the system is constructed so that 'people like us' run no realistic risk of 
such punishment, some nonpolitical check on excessive severity is needed." See Ely, 
supra note 229, at 173. Justice Marshall has also embraced the prejudice argument. 
See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 377 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("In the 
current climate, it is unrealistic to expect legislatures to care whether the prisons are 
overcrowded .... "). 
269 By arguing that criminal defendants are a discrete and insular minority that will 
be prejudiced by the political process, this Note does not mean to suggest that crimi-
nal defendants constitute a suspect class for equal protection or other purposes. See 
Prisoners' Rights, 84 Geo. L.J. 1465, 1494 n.2975 (1996) (collecting cases holding that 
prisoners are not a suspect class). Independent of suspect classifications, the argument 
has been made that it is the judiciary's job to protect those who cannot count on the 
political process for protection. See Susan R. Klein, The Discriminatory Application 
of Substantive Due Process: A Tale of Two Vehicles, 1997 U. TILL. Rev. 453,489 (ar-
guing that criminals can be viewed as politically powerless and in need of the 
judiciary's protection without being viewed as a suspect class); Barry R. Bell, Note, 
Prisoners' Rights, Institutional Needs, and the Burger Court, 72 Va. L. Rev. 161, 190 
n.193 (1986) ("Prisoners ... are not perceived as a 'suspect class.' At the same time, 
however, they are a peculiarly 'discrete and insular' minority poorly protected by the 
political process, and thus require a measure of judicial protection."). 
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Court has provided rigorous proportionality protection to punitive 
damages awards while affording only curt proportionality review to 
criminal punishments. The Court's jurisprudence ignores the real-
ity that criminal defendants are in much greater need of the 
judiciary's protection than those likely to be victimized by exces-
sive punitive damages. 
The legislative process is equipped to deal with the problem of 
excessive punitive damages awards, and a plethora of laws have 
been enacted to combat that problem. Those advocating limits on 
punitive damages do not face obstacles in the political process nor 
can they be construed as a discrete and insular minority that will 
face prejudice and inaction from legislatures. Finally, since no clear 
constitutional provision forbids excessive punitive damages awards, 
the courts have no reason to intervene in this legislative domain. 
Conversely, there is a sound reason for the judiciary to exert its 
countermajoritarian weight in the criminal punishment area. Put-
ting aside the plausible, though inconclusive, argument that the 
Eighth Amendment was intended to protect against disproportion-
ate punishments, as well as the plausible argument that some 
criminal defendants were denied access to the political process be-
cause they could not vote, a compelling argument can be made 
that, even with access to the political process, criminal defendants 
constitute a discrete and insular minority that will face prejudice in 
the political process. In a political world where winning elections 
depends in part on being "tough on crime," proportionate punish-
ments become an expendable commodity. Since it appears impossible 
to lose an election by being too tough on crime, it is not realistic to 
believe that the political process will adequately protect criminal 
defendants, even those who vote. Since criminal defendants facing 
disproportionate punishments cannot tum to the political process, 
it falls to the judiciary to protect them from disproportionate pun-
ishments. 
The Supreme Court must reconsider its decisions affording more 
rigorous proportionality review to excessive punitive damages 
awards than to excessive criminal punishments. Instead of protect-
ing the beneficiaries of the political process, the Court should focus 
on protecting those who cannot protect themselves. 
